Examining the Underlying Conditions Presdisposing Societies to Terrorism more

INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS WITHIN SOCIETIES WHICH PREDISPOSE THEM TO TERRORISM? This thesis will attempt to examine the underlying conditions which predispose societies to terrorism. Hundreds of varying theories have been presented by theorists to date in an attempt to explain why our world sees the terrorism that it does today. These theories influence government policy regarding the subject of terrorism, yet its use continues. This paper examines current doctrine regarding the underlying conditions of the predisposition for some societies to terrorism to evaluate their applicability in today¶s world. The paper will specifically focus within three distinct regions to provide balance to the discussion and to illustrate the applicability of the conclusions. These areas are Western Europe Northern Ireland, Northern Africa and the Middle East in Algeria and Eastern Europe in the North Caucus within the territory designated as Chechnya. Each chapter of this thesis will present a different case study of the history of a terrorist group and its country of origin. After setting historical foundations, the chapters then analyze these accounts in relation to modern theories of terrorism. The purpose of the paper is to test the current and varying theories of experts in the field of terrorism to evaluate whether all of these theories should or should not be included in further research. This paper was limited to this goal only, in the hope that the resulting foundation of verified theories would simplify future research through the possible elimination of some of the current less explanatory factors. Since it was possible that the importance of the underlying factors which predisposed certain groups to the use of terrorism could differ from case to case, this paper only attempts to provide a framework for the 1 analysis of future case studies of different countries. Additional larger studies could reveal the relative importance of the different factors that predispose societies to terrorism. Methodology: The thesis tests theories of terrorism which are based on the arguments derived from five working groups on the topic at the March 2005, Madrid Summit. Over two-hundred experts were gathered into seventeen working groups to discuss topics of ³democracy, terrorism and security at this summit.1 Of the seventeen total groups, five of the working groups were devoted to understanding the underlying conditions of terrorism. The groups included the top experts from around the world who are knowledgeable on the categories of terrorism resulting from cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious (or ideological) factors. The case study will use the working groups to test the arguments that have been developed by theorists within these categories in order to help bring further understanding to the topic of terrorism. These theories are evaluated and tested based on their applicability and relevance to the terrorism evidenced in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, the Front du Liberation National (FLN), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and the rebels of Chechnya. Hypothesis: This paper will test the hypothesis that claims multiple combinations of underlying conditions within society blend together to predispose societies to the use of terrorism. In 1 Louise Richardson, The Roots of Terrorism. (New York: Routeledge), 2006, 176-185. 2 spite of the fact that these combinations of factors will vary in importance from case to case, the paper tests whether all of the potential conditions mentioned at the Madrid Summit are confirmed in the case studies presented. Based on these case studies, it should be apparent that it is impossible to designate only one factor as completely explanatory of the underlying conditions which predispose some societies to the use of terrorism. The most comprehensive explanation of the roots of terrorism therefore should include a range of factors that include those found within cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious or other ideological elements of society. Before proceeding to the case studies, the paper will provide a brief explanation of these factors and the theories that are tested in the analysis sections of this thesis. Defining Terrorism: The experts of the Madrid Summit and multiple theorists from around the world determined that terrorism is a ³tactic employed by many different types of groups in many parts of the world in pursuit of many different objectives´.2 This thesis refers to modern nonstate actors of the last century who have used tactics which include but are not limited to methods such as airline hijacking, assassinations, car and suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), public beating or shootings, etc. to achieve their goals.3 These tactics should not be confused with those used by rebellion forces during times of guerrilla warfare within their own country. 2 Plenary: Preliminary Conclusions of the Working Groups , International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, Spain: (March 8-11, 2005). Transcript available from http://english.safedemocracy.org/keynotes/plenary-preliminary-conclusions-of-the-working-groups.html#transcrip 3 Ibid. 3 The proceeding chapters will reveal situations in which minority opposition movements initially used conventional military force against a state military and the ruling regime with hopes of making changes favorable to the disadvantaged group. A smaller military force using ³hit-and-run´ tactics, the surrounding geography for cover and the support of the population to blend in and hide from a stronger force is not terrorism. These scenarios illustrate the possibility for confusion within the ongoing debate regarding whether someone using these tactics should be labeled as a ³freedom fighter´ hoping to free his people from oppression or as a ³terrorist´ attempting to disrupt the government and the society as a whole. To a ruling regime and those who have beneficial status within the current situation, the opposition forces could be labeled as ³terrorists´. However, the populations represented by the opposition forces see these soldiers as a symbol of change to the poor status of the group and may label them as ³freedom fighters´. This thesis does not attempt to pass judgment or decide how groups using violence should be labeled. Getting caught up in such a debate would take away from the goal of attempting to understand the evolution from peaceful opposition to violence and why the groups shifted from targeting militaries to civilians to achieve their goals. The definition of terrorism that best describes the groups within this thesis was developed after almost five months of contemplation and discussion at the Madrid Summit. The large group of experts concluded that terrorism is ³the pursuit of political ends by violence against civilians or noncombatants where the purpose is sowing fear in that population´.4 Regardless of the sometimes seemingly justified violent responses from these groups or morals involved, those which use tactics targeting civilians of the state of the imposing government are engaging in terrorist activity. 4 Ibid. 4 Cultural and Religious Factors: Some theorists believe that cultural conditions within society have the potential to predispose certain regions to the use of terrorism. Multiple theorists attempt to attribute the use of terrorism to the specific targeting of an ethnic or religious group by the state. One aspect of the argument explains that terrorism can be viewed as a last resort for groups after its members¶ ethnicity or religion have confronted a history of inequality, oppression, unfair treatment, lack of freedom, threats toward their group or violence.5 It is therefore the shared sense of injustice among the members of the certain ethnic or religious group that creates feelings of anger and hostility toward those viewed as the progenitor of oppression. History and geography for example can influence an ethnic group when it feels it has been treated unjustly or instill a feeling of loss if sovereignty is diminished by an outside entity.6 To summarize, the cultural argument consists of the ³shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths, and traditions´ that exist among differening populations that fuel the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to the development of fanaticism, violence and terrorism.7 These shared traits are used by the leaders of violent oppositional movements to rally the population against the government. Theorists believe that strong ideology and religion can be used to fanaticize oppositional movements as well. However, an alternative argument states that the ³new´ terrorist Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 6 Thomas Mockaitis, The New Terrorism: Myths and Reality. (Westport: Praeger Security International), 2007. 7 Jeffrey Ross, Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.30, No.3 (Aug. 1993): 317-329. 5 5 movements today could in fact be based on the inherently violent nature of religion found within the doctrine of any faith. Utilizing Islamic radicalism as an example, any violence used by jihadists is considered morally justified. based on the necessity of advancing the cause of their religion and their understanding of jihad as a form of the purification required to enter paradise upon death. 8 Most Muslims are not violent, since moderates believe that jihad is an important internal struggle within one¶s soul (or fighting within, in order to be fully submissive to Allah) and a call to advance the faith.9 However Morgan argues that ³chaos and destruction´ are the ³ends in themselves´ for radical Islamic groups, as they morally justify violence as necessary to advance their religious cause. 10 Here a small group of fanatically driven people within a religion work to bring about chaos and destruction instead of political change. 11 For those of an extremist religious belief such as this, the only solution is to create a ³pan-Islamic empire´ in which the rule of God (rather than secular beliefs) would form the basis of society.12 The goal for the group would be the alteration of the entire international system, rather than of simply gaining political representation or further independence. There is no end; no possible negotiation to bring peace and no settlement that will appease groups within this category of religious terrorism. By basing their arguments on religious doctrine, the group creates a war against an enemy (e.g., secularism) in which no compromise is possible, since the opponent they face 8 Matthew Morgan, The Origins of the New Terrorism, Policy Review (April and May 2009): http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.pdf. 9 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2003. 10 Morgan, 32-34. 11 Ibid, 41. 12 James Poland, Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall Inc.), 2010. 6 threatens (in their mind) the existence of their culture. 13 This explanation is helpful in understanding why religious cults such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, right-wing Christian fanatics such as those seen recently in the Oslo, Norway attacks and al Qaeda all have used violence. The salient point derived from this is that any religion and its doctrine can be used as a veil to hide the negative aspects inherent in terrorism, in order to promote violent action in the redress of grievances. Thus, religious doctrine and dogma has the potential to bring individuals together in support of a cause that may not actually be religious at all. Economic Factors: This section will examine questions regarding the relationship between economic factors such as a country¶s GDP (Gross Domestic Product), individual income and poverty, relative deprivation and the adoption of terrorism. To date, theorists have developed arguments claiming both positive and negative linkages between economic factors and terrorism. The articles included are based on relevancy to the topic to the Madrid Terrorism Summit of 2005 within the ³economic factors´ working group. Both the theories providing evidence for and against economics¶ role in terrorism are included to provide balance to the argument. In lieu of hundreds of case studies of the many terrorist groups and movements that exist, theorists have extrapolated data into overarching theories regarding similar topics to those discussed previously. Some theorists conclude that societies faced with economic problems can constitute areas in which terrorism can potentially arise or become fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana develop one of the most comprehensive 13 Juergensmeyer, 149-152. 7 arguments. The theorists claim that groups use terrorism when there is a persistent negative economic status that is systemically resistant to political or institutional reform.14 In addition, these academics expect that conflicts arise more frequently when economic circumstances among poor and dissident groups are not satisfied with their share of available resources.15 The opposition groups turn to terrorism in this case when the costs of a fullscale rebellion are too high, due to a country¶s ability to respond with larger, better equipped armies. An all-out rebellion would occur instead if the government was not able to respond effectively to the opposition movement, due to a lack of finances from a fragile economy or weak institutions.16 Mark Jurgensmeyer has a slightly different argument, but conceptually remains in favor of the potential for economic conditions to create the predisposition to the use of terrorism. Jurgensmeyer claims that high inflation or high unemployment rates can multiply the anxieties which all young men feel.17 In his view high inflation or unemployment rates contribute to the creation of many frustrated young individuals living in a concentrated area, since the availability of affordable housing for the unemployed are usually concentrated in low-income housing or slum like areas within the city. He states that jobs are prerequisites for men in traditional societies prior to marriage. In a traditional society, if these men cannot have a wife, they cannot have sex; which leads to further frustration and resentment.18 He expands his theory by arguing that economic woes can lead to desperation or anger that is directed at the government, which in turn may cause unrest in the society. 14 Brock Blomberg et al, An Economic Model of Terrorism. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2004. Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Juergensmeyer, 194. 18 Ibid, 194. 15 8 These feelings of frustration seem to make alternative terrorist movements promising options, as they provide the hope of bringing about positive changes to the society. Andrew Natsios offers a similar argument when he states that one must take into account that ³militias recruit from the ranks of restive, unemployed youths who are easily seduced into the criminal activities that support terrorism.´19 Since not everyone who faces economic deprivation becomes a terrorist, it seems that the perceived oppression and absence of political rights mentioned in the arguments above are necessary formative elements. Jessica Stern offers a similar outlook regarding the role that government- permitted unemployment (through discrimination in education, as well as employment) can play in promoting terrorism. She states that poor and illiterate countries may lack the funds necessary to provide public education in rural areas. 20 In order to fill the void, privately funded schools such as Islamic based madrasahs not only provide a free (though parochially focused) education, but also offer free food, housing and clothing. 21 This may seem to be a positive substitute, but Stern argues that the quality and type of education a madrasah student receives is more likely to produce negative future results. She states that because the madrasahs are independently financed, they can teach outside the subject areas required by the state. This involves preaching a ³narrow and violent version of Islam´ and many ignore secular subjects that prepare students for jobs in a modern society, which leads to economically unstable outcomes.22 19 Andrew Natsios, Fighting Terror with Aid: Underlying Conditions that Foster Terrorism , Harvard Review, (Fall 2004). 20 Jessica Stern. (2002). Pakistan s Jihad Culture . In: Harvey W. Kushner, (ed). Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), pp119129. 21 Ibid, 122. 22 Stern, 122. 9 One theory claims that poverty itself does not directly cause terrorism. Instead, relative deprivation and structural inequalities help to facilitate the emergence of both societal grievances and radical political movements. Ted Gurr claims that when the gap between what one gets and what one believes he or she should get is large, the more likely an individual is to turn to violence.23 Gurr provides further explanation by stating that people become resentful and disposed to political violence when there is a collective perception that they do not enjoy the same economic or political advantages and opportunities as other groups.24 Krueger and Laitin also claim that there are few economic conditions which create origins of terrorism. The theorists of this argument demonstrate that there is a link between the terrorist¶s country of origin and the target country in which the attack occurs.25 Instead of poverty, the data presents a situation in which terrorism comes from countries that suffer from political oppression while the targets are countries that are economically successful.26 The authors also acknowledge that two separate findings of Nasra Hassan and Bueno de Mesquita in 2001 and 2003 could explain how poverty plays a role in terrorism. Hasan discovered through interviews from 1996-1999 that Palestinian militants were not poor, uneducated or psychologically incompetent but indeed, were middle class with jobs.27 The conclusion of the study was that individuals may become terrorists because of poverty in their country of affinity, rather than as a result of their own personal scarcity. Bueno de Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1970. Ted Gurr. (2006), Economic Factors . In: Louise Richardson, (ed). The Roots of Terrorism, (New York: Routledge), p. 85-101. 25 Alan Krueger and David Laitin. (2007). Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism. In: Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, (ed). Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.148-173. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, 148-149. 24 23 10 Mesquita reiterates this supposition through an observation that terrorist organizations screen many applicants but may only choose the best.28 It may be the case that individuals¶ economic circumstances are hidden from the data since poverty could push many poor to attempt to join a terrorist organization, who subsequently are not chosen. These claims would explain how (in an earlier study) Krueger and Maleckova found that those living above the poverty line or having a secondary education actually were positively associated with participation in terrorist activities in the case of Hezbollah.29 In this argument, terrorists are educated and wealthy rather than originating from the lower levels of society. The role of poverty as a predisposing condition for societies¶ use of terrorism was ruled out. This section provided a glimpse of the heated debate regarding the relationship between those who believe in a positive economic relationship for the origins of terrorism and those who do not. The next section will clarify a range of arguments that have less of a focus on economics. These theorists consider political conditions within societies to be more explanatory of the predisposition for the use of terrorism. Political Factors: Multiple theories have been developed in an attempt to explain how political conditions have the ability to affect the use of terrorism in some societies. A few of these theories have been selected here, in order to capture the ideas of the majority of arguments and represent those that are important for the purposes of this paper. In cases of terrorism in which 28 29 Ibid, 149. Alan Kruegar and Jitka Maleckova. Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.17, 4 (Fall 2003): 119-144. 11 political conditions predispose societies to its use, radical group attempts to gain political power or to take control of territory to address grievances and/or to protest against the current regime. This radical group separates itself from others when it uses the most violent of methods to protest the legitimacy of the regime. Ehud Sprinzak provides a beneficial summary of this theory. According to Ehud Sprinzak, ³terrorism implies a crisis of legitimacy´ and ³since terrorism never emerges overnight, the crisis of legitimacy unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society and the regime.´30 Within most cultures there are groups that have negative attitudes as a result of some form of discrimination or feelings of injustice. Over time this sentiment becomes increasingly prominent in the ³nation¶s folklore, historical legends, literature and daily conversation´ but does not result in terrorism.31 These feelings are transferred into a political movement, as those affected hope to obtain improved societal conditions or independence from the regime. At this point, terrorism can occur when radical factions of the movement become agitated, if ³repeated rejection of peaceful demands and repression of riots and demonstrations´ leads to impatience, frustration and feelings of oppression.32 The subsequent rejection of the regime results in a call for ³liberation now´ as the perceived oppressive government becomes an ³illegitimate foreign occupant´ that must be replaced with leaders who are more empathetic to their goals.33 Radical leaders use the existing political environment and grievances to Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 31 32 30 Ibid, 59. Ibid, 60. 33 Ibid, 60. 12 inculcate and fanaticize sections of the population to join their movement or to gain sympathy from those who choose against doing so. The inability to make changes in the face of a perceived oppressive regime is an important factor to consider in the development of international, nationalist and religious terrorism. Regime type is particularly important for theorists arguing in favor of political factors. Industrialized democracies seem to be especially prone to factors that encourage terrorism against them; not only for more obvious cultural discrepancies but also because they are seen as an oppressive regime to some groups. Robert Pape narrows the argument of a perceived oppressor to a focus of suicide terrorism against democracies. Pape argues that terrorists attack to achieve specific political goals. 34 He explains that suicide terrorist attacks occur as part of a continued campaign in order to coerce today¶s democracies to achieve territorial goals.35 Pape believes that the main factor contributing to suicide terrorism is the desire to win concessions from a democracy, such as the withdrawal of military forces from the group¶s home land.36 Pape views democracies as particularly vulnerable to suicide terrorist campaigns. He argues that these campaigns ³inflict punishment on the opposing society´ through attacks on civilians or military personnel in order to cause fear. 37 This fear or unwillingness to incur further casualties among the population of a democracy arguably forces politicians to appease terrorist goals in order to maintain a favorable position within their constituencies (in order to maintain power by continuing in office.) The selection of groups electing to use suicide terrorism against countries with a Robert Pape, ³The Strategic Logic of Terrorism,´ The American Political Science Review, Vol.97, 3 (August, 2003):343-361. 35 Ibid, 344. 36 Ibid, 344. 37 Ibid, 346. 34 13 military presence within their territory seems consistent with the theory that a perceived oppressive regime is present and must be dealt with as a precursor to positive societal change. This theory can be extended to the use of terrorism in general, rather than limiting its application merely to suicide terrorism. Alberto Abadie also concludes that the level of political rights, the degree of fractionalization and geography can be persuasive stimuli in the development of terrorism. 38 Abadie¶s regressions show that autocratic regimes¶ repressive nature appears capable of keeping terrorism from developing, while intermediate levels of political freedom (possibly during political transitions when instability is at a climax) seem to foster favorable conditions for the occurrence of violence. 39 Abadie also argues that geographic factors can provide an environment suitable for the creation and continued presence of terrorist groups. Abadie states that mountainous terrain or jungle can allow the groups to train or produce illicit drugs in safety, due to the difficulty of securing unannounced access to these areas by governmental forces.40 In this case, it is apparent that the inability of the state to enforce the law in these areas is instrumental in the creation and sustainability of certain movements. It is possible to imagine scenarios in which off-shoot groups of Al-Qaeda would not have been created in certain areas if the environmental conditions mentioned above were not available to provide for communication, networking, and training without fear of U.S. military attack. The geography also physically separates the terrorist members from a more moderate majority that can temper fanaticism and ultimately diminish the success of the group over the Alberto Abadie, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, The American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.2 (May, 2006): 50-56. 39 Ibid, 54. 40 Ibid, 53. 38 14 long term. The inability for mainstream politics and government law enforcement to reach people in geographically isolated areas is then a key factor to consider in certain circumstances. For some theorists, all of the structural factors mentioned above are not enough to explain why some turn to terrorism. In addition to the conditions within societies that can predispose them to the use of terrorism, it is necessary to also discuss individual and group psychological factors. Psychological Factors: The last section of terrorism¶s developmental theories focuses on those theories espousing individual psychological and group dynamics. There are few theorists that disregard psychological factors (or the power of individual emotions, relationships, history and societal inclusion) in contributing to terrorism completely. Some favor other explanations and argue these could be more influential than psychological factors, but none have made claims that completely rule out the psychology of the groups and the individual in this discussion. This section will first discuss a group dynamics theory and will close by explaining the arguments in favor of the view that terrorism is a rational choice given the situation faced by groups and individuals within their society. Group Dynamics: Abrahms and Crenshaw argue that engaging in terrorism is a group activity in which interactions involving intimate relationships among a small number of people take place and that this can be an important factor in determining terrorist behavior. 41 According to this 41 Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, International Security, Vol.32, No.4 (Spring 2008): 78-105. 15 approach, individuals participate in terrorist organizations for the social solidarity they can obtain to combat feelings of alienation, rather than to further the political agenda adhered to by the group.42 Abrahms believes that social relations with other terrorist members are important contributing factors for those who feel ³loneliness, rejection, or exclusion from relationships, groups, or society.´ 43 The opportunity to be a part of an organization that is admired, respected or feared (or provides a team atmosphere in a community where security problems erode normal societal possibilities) can explain why some relatively educated and economically well-off individuals join terrorist groups and engage in violence. Rational Choice: Hoffman and Pape argue that acts of terrorism are rational decisions based on the environment, circumstances and conditions of the society. Groups and individuals decide to use violent methods in order to gain supporters, coerce opponents, or earn employment outside the options available within the normal market. Terrorism therefore is not a result of crazy, irrational thinking.44 Theorists of this view in particular believe that terrorists are inherently rational in an instrumental way, because they plan operations in order to shock and intimidate the public of a target country (through the attention they receive through the media by using violent acts.) 45 Hoffman continues by stating that terrorists plan and execute acts of violence while taking into account their goals, available resources, capabilities and the ³target audience´ of their actions. 46 This theory claims that the acts of violence are not Abrahms , 94-96. Ibid, 96. 44 Bruce Hoffman, The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology, Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2002 and Pape, 344-347. 45 Hoffman, 63-64, and Pape, 344-347. 46 Hoffman, 64. 43 42 16 indiscriminate, but rather are planned and logical decisions based on the environment and situation within which each group or individual finds themselves. This theory also illuminates a potential dichotomy between terrorist leaders¶ and lower-level members¶ reasons for choosing and engaging in terrorism. Even though group leaders may make a rational choice based on the situation they find themselves in (that is, to turn to terrorism), lower-level members may not share the same decision making capacity or discretion and can be forced to follow their leaders¶ choices. Their lack of choice within the group could mean that non-leaders (the majority of those within a terrorist group) could still be joining in an attempt to gain a sense of solidarity and provide a meaning to their lives. Chapter Summaries Ch. 1: Northern Ireland and the IRA The first chapter of the thesis evaluated the theories of potential conditions which predispose certain societies to terrorism, specifically that of the IRA from 1968-1999 in Northern Ireland. The analysis section revealed that each theory tested could be confirmed in this case. However based on the variety of theories discussed throughout the course of this case study, it seems necessary to pay particular attention to the role that the perceived oppression of one group over another, feelings of socio-economic and/or political marginalization and relative deprivation can play in the generation of terrorism and violence. The chapter illustrated that IRA violence can largely be attributed to the feelings of oppression that were created over time as Catholics faced unequal access to jobs, housing, and an unbiased education (compared to Protestants living within Northern Ireland) beginning in the early stages of the 20th century. The results of this unequal access 17 demonstrate that economic theories and feelings of relative marginalization or deprivation that can cause unrest have the potential to explain a great deal when attempting to understand the underlying conditions which led to terrorism. Historical accounts show that basic grievances stemming from this assumption can help to explain why groups use violence to gain support when faced with an inability to realize goals of social change effectively through the formal, current political system. State or other forms of violence against peaceful attempts at change (political rallies or marches in protest for example) precipitated terrorist action in response. The progression of one group¶s continued relative dominance or discrimination over another can also explain how religion could be misunderstood as the reason for violence in Northern Ireland since power was divided between Catholics and Protestants. Ch.2: Algeria, AQIM and the FLN The second chapter of the thesis also evaluated the theories of potential conditions which predispose certain societies to terrorism, specifically that of the FLN, GIA /GSPC and AQIM in Algeria. The analysis section revealed that each theory tested could be confirmed in this case. However, based on the theories discussed throughout the course of this case study, it also seems necessary to pay particular attention to the role that the perceived oppression of one group over another, feelings of socio-economic and/or political marginalization and relative deprivation can play in the generation of terrorism and violence. The European and French settlers held an overbearing and prominent position in both economics and politics relative to the native Muslim Algerians. The inability for peaceful changes to occur and the repression of French forces in Algiers in particular seem to have 18 heavily influenced the violence of the Algerians¶ war of independence from France. Poor economic and political conditions for Muslim Algerians created a place for extreme rhetoric and radical doctrine, which eventually translated into ³Arabization´ of the cities and the civil war of the 1990s. The continued feelings of oppression, violence against civilians and continued lack of change throughout this time also seems to have contributed to the creation of the AQIM movement in 2006. Ch.3: Chechnya and its rebels The third chapter of the thesis also evaluated the theories of potential conditions which predispose certain societies to terrorism, specifically that of the rebels in Chechnya. The analysis section revealed that each theory tested could be confirmed in this case. It was apparent from the historical account provided that the deportations of the 1940s under Stalin contributed to initial feelings of oppression. This was later combined with other negative events such as a coup attempt, the destruction of cities and heavy civilian casualties from the Russian army (in addition to economic and political circumstances) to predispose the society to terrorism. In addition, poor economic conditions fueled further grievances and pushed some toward the black market and terrorist activity as an alternative form of income. The Chechen predicament in relation to Russians in their own community and Russians across the country was relatively poor. The relative deprivation of this group seems to have been influential in predisposing the region to terrorism. Psychologically, rational choice theory was confirmed as the use of violence given the circumstances provided appeared to be a logically made decision. Further evidence of group-think and attempts to use violence in response to traumatic events experienced by the militant or a family member were conclusive as well. 19 THESIS CH. 1, CASE STUDY: WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH PREDISPOSED THE REGION TO TERRORISM? Introduction: This paper will attempt to examine the underlying conditions which predisposed the region to the initiation of the Irish Republican Army¶s (IRA) terrorist movement in Northern Ireland from 1968-1999. This chapter will first present a history of the conflict in Northern Ireland, prior to testing the theories mentioned previously in the introduction section of this paper. The analysis portion of the paper will refer to theories derived from categories related to cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious factors of terrorism. These theories are evaluated based on their applicability and relevance to the terrorism of the IRA and violence in Northern Ireland. The evaluations help to test the hypothesis that claims that multiple combinations of underlying conditions within a society blend together to predispose that society to the use of terrorism. Theorists have been unable to produce a unified definition of terrorism. However, throughout the thesis I will refer to acts of terrorism as was defined by the experts of the 2005 Madrid Summit. To reiterate, this definition relates that terrorism is ³the pursuit of political ends by violence against civilians or non-combatants where the purpose is sowing fear in that population´.47 Tactics include but are not limited to methods such as airline hijacking, assassinations, car and suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), public beating or shootings, etc.48 The goal for groups during the time period under analysis was (predominately) to gain recognition, representation or other political goals from the state government in which 47 48 Ibid. Ibid. 20 the group operated. This chapter will explore the underlying conditions which led to these goals and the terrorism that resulted, through an analysis of the history that is presented in the next section. History: 17th Century: Establishment of Protestant Rule in Ireland Historians of Ireland have traced the origins of the conflict back to the early portions of the 17th century when James I ratified a policy in 1603 to consolidate English Protestant rule in Ireland (by removing disloyal Catholics in favor of those faithful to the crown.) 49 In 1641 a rebellion of Catholics against the Protestant settlers resulted in thousands being killed. The rebellion continued through 1649 until an army of 20,000 led by Oliver Cromwell landed in Ireland and was able to establish (by force) parliamentary authority throughout the country, for England.50 Forty years later, rebellion resumed in 1689, but was short-lived (in comparison to the duration of prior conflict.) The Battle of the Boyne of 1690 proved to be a decisive victory over the Irish, as William of Orange cemented an English and Protestant presence in Ireland for centuries to come.51 18-19th Century: Ideological Opposition and Irish Potato Famine The next two centuries consisted predominately of ideological opposition, rather than the physical rebellion that was evidenced in the 1600s. In 1845 the Irish Potato Famine began. Industry was heavily concentrated in the North Eastern (Protestant concentrated) area Philip Barnes, Was the Northern Ireland Conflict Religious? Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol.20, No.1, (2005): 55-69. 50 Ibid, 57. 51 Ibid, 57. 49 21 of Ireland, while the rest of the country worked predominantly in agriculture. As crops began to fail, the ability of agricultural workers to feed their families and earn a living greatly diminished. Britain did little to help the Irish at the time. Over one million Irish died as Britain gave little usable aid and continued to require the same food export quotas from Ireland, irrespective of need throughout the impoverished country.52 Early 20th Century: Civil War, Creation of Northern Ireland and Protestant Control of Government In the early 20th century, the suspension of a proposed Home Rule bill in the British parliament brought action to the suppressed feelings of oppression, as 1000 men from the Irish Republic Brotherhood (IRB, the early form of the IRA) revolted by attempting to take control of government buildings and declaring Ireland a Republic.53 The revolt was short lived, as it encountered heavy opposition from British troops and ended with the execution of its leaders.54 The ensuing Civil War resulted in the British planning to withdraw from Ireland entirely. This hope was met with resistance from fearful Protestants living in the North. Instead, Britain chose to partition the island into two parts by passing the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. Britain would continue its government presence in the newly established Northern Ireland and an Irish government was designated for the remaining area of the island.55 The final arrangement consisted of six of the nine counties of Ulster becoming Northern Ireland. The creation of Northern Ireland embedded the hope of maintaining the Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens, The Causes of Terrorism: The Case of Northern Ireland , Presentation at the International Studies Association s Annual Meeting, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, Hawaii. 53 Ibid, 9. 54 Ibid, 11. 55 Barnes, 57. 52 22 prominent Protestant Unionist position and the British connection in Ireland.56 Within Ulster¶s traditional nine counties in the North, there were 900,000 Protestants, ³most of whom wanted to continue the connection with Westminster, as opposed to 700,000 Catholics who wanted to end it´. The political logic behind the choice of the six counties that became Northern Ireland becomes apparent when one considers that within the six counties there were 820,000 Protestants and 430,000 Catholics. The outcome of the 1921 general election shows how politically beneficial this arrangement was for Unionists, as they won forty out of the fifty-two seats. 57 The Unionists used this power in government to create the 1922 Special Powers Act, which gave the minister for home affairs (a Unionist) the ability to take any step necessary to ³preserve the peace´ within the region. In addition, an exclusively Protestant security regimen for Northern Ireland, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was established as well.58 Political power was also used to pass and renew The Civil Authorities (or Special Powers) Act which imposed a curfew, restricted public meetings, warranted the arrest for the possession of ³unlawful´ documents, and provided for permissible flogging.59 The government extended this authority to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the B Specials; which were mostly Protestant (due to employment discrimination.)60 The physical separation of the island into two separate governing regions created further ideological division within the Catholic and Protestant populations. Many traditional Loyalists claimed allegiance to the Crown (as long as the Crown supported Protestant rights Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc.), 1997. 57 Ibid, 21. 58 Ibid, 22. 59 Ibid, 22. 60 Ruane and Todd, 120. 56 23 and its community against enemies) and later was adopted by many within Unionism, which included the belief in a British identity and an economic and political connection to the Crown.61 This contrasted with Irish Nationalism and Republicanism which valued the distinctive Gaelic culture, saw the English conquests of the 17th century as oppressive, historically fought for freedom and independence and hoped for a united Irish nation.62 Further acts of government negatively affected the Catholic position within society as the abolishment of proportional representation in 1923 (in favor of a plurality voting system) allowed Protestants to gerrymander districts in such a way as to maintain a majority in parliament. The Education Act of 1930 for example, essentially provided funding to create a state educational system that was based on Protestant beliefs and doctrine. Thus, Catholics were forced to either attend a school that would not teach children according to their beliefs or attend poorly funded Catholic schools. As time passed, Nationalists grew dissatisfied with a continued British presence and Republicans were not satisfied with the conditions Catholics faced under a Protestant majority held government. Fighting continued until 1949 when the Republicans were able to achieve complete independence from the British in the south as the Republic of Ireland was created.63 An independent government was established in the Republic which gave the Irish people full autonomy over their decision making policies. In contrast, Northern Ireland¶s representation was biased toward the Protestant population (due to the abolishment of Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996. 62 Ibid, 84-89. 63 Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 10. 61 24 proportional representation and the use of gerrymandering) to allow the group to remain in control of the majority of parliamentary seats.64 Mid-20th Century: Catholic Civil Rights Movement and the Modern IRA The mid 1960s witnessed a successful non-violent civil rights campaign led by Catholics who were inspired by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Multiple Catholic groups (with international and even some Protestant support) attempted to bring about reform through marches and by ³documenting, publicizing and lobbying for an end to abuses- discrimination in jobs and housing, unfair electoral procedures (in particular the gerrymandering to maintain Protestant political control), and the ³Special Powers Act.´ 65 The non-violent marches proved to be significant as Northern Ireland¶s geography is heavily sectarianized between Catholic and Protestant areas. The marches that were directed through ³Protestant territory´ were seen as a ³direct challenge´ to established Protestant dominance, which provoked loyalist anger in these areas.66 1969 was an important turning point in the quest for societal reform. In August of 1969 a Protestant group was given permission by the Northern Irish government to partake in a traditional nationalist march in Londonderry.67 Catholic residents of the area called the Bogside met the march with violence by throwing petrol bombs and bricks at the Protestant police force (the Royal Ulster Constabulary, or RUC) and those they were trying to protect.68 64 65 Ibid, 19. Ruane and Todd, 125-127. 66 Ibid, 127. 67 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press), 2000. 68 Ibid, 54. 25 The RUC responded with tear gas and the throwing of stones, but rioting continued for days until Protestant mobs charged past the police and began destroying Catholic houses. 69 Further rioting broke out in Belfast, as hundreds of houses were set on fire and guns were employed by some of those involved. During the riots, eight people died (four by the RUC and another by a member of the local branch of the UVF), at least 750 people were injured, 1,800 families fled their homes (1,500 of which were Catholic) and 180 homes were destroyed.70 A new Irish Republican Army (IRA) was created in an attempt to protect those not protected by the security forces during this violence and the British Army was called in to provide stability to the region.71 Later in 1969, the Northern Irish and British governments established the Cameron Commission to report on the disturbances. The Commission found that the causes of the disorder were a ³rising sense of grievance among Roman Catholics particularly because of unfair methods of allocating public housing´ and that grievances included gerrymandering of local boundaries in favor of Unionists, unfair treatment of the ³B´ Specials of the UVF and the Special Powers Act.72 The Commission determined that the Civil Rights movement was ³not narrowly sectarian or politically subversive´ but instead was a movement ³which drew support from a wide measure of moderate opinion on many sides.´ 73 The British government put pressure on the Northern Irish government to make reforms to address the issues but those put into place did little to meaningfully address the concerns of the Catholic minority. As a result, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ibid,54. Ibid, 55-60. 71 Ibid, 55-60. 72 Peter Rose, How the Troubles Came to Northern Ireland, (New York: St. Martin s Press, Inc.), 2000. 73 Ibid, 168. 70 69 26 factionalized into those who wished to use political means to address grievances through Sinn Fein and unite Ireland; and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) who were violent traditionalists.74 As the violence got out of hand, the British troops instituted a curfew in 1970 which involved house-to-house searches (that left 20,000 people unable to leave their homes and four dead) in what many saw as oppression.75 In addition, the British hoped that a policy of internment over the next four years could make sure people did not take the law into their own hands, as those believed to contribute to the use of violence of any kind were arrested.76 In 1971 170 people were killed, 2,600 were injured, there were 17,000 homes searched but no Protestants were interned in the process.77 The PIRA targeted the British Army in particular from 1971-1974. According to data depicting ³deaths by year and status´ published in Lost Lives 44, 108, 59, and 45 soldiers were killed in each year from 1971 (the beginning of internment) until the end of 1974 (the end of internment) respectively. This is compared to zero British Army deaths in 1970 and fifteen in 1975.78 The Catholic civilian death count each year from 1971 until 1975 is much higher than Protestant civilians during the same period. According to the same table 65, 174, 80, 123, and 100 Catholic civilians died during this period while 27, 77, 48, 51, and 62 Protestant civilians died.79 The heightened insecurity of the area came to a peak during the event in 1972 that has come to be known as Bloody Sunday. Police and army forces brought in to protect Catholics McKittrick and McVea, 60. Ibid, 61. 76 Ibid, 61. 77 Ibid, 67-70. 78 David McKittrick et. al, Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing), 1999. 79 Ibid, Table. 75 74 27 from Protestant violence were captured on film by television newscasts as they fired into a crowd, killing thirteen unarmed people.80 Based on the ensuing violence of 1972, this event bolstered PIRA recruitment and provided evidence of the collusion and oppression some were looking for to provide support for violence. In 1972, Republican and loyalist groups combined to account for five-hundred deaths, five-thousand injuries, two-thousand explosions, ten-thousand shooting incidents, and almost two-thousand armed robberies that ³netted´ £800,000.81 One day in particular has been labeled as ³Bloody Friday´ due to the nine deaths and one-hundred thirty injuries that took place in a little over an hour, as twenty bombs were detonated by the PIRA.82 The following two decades followed a similar pattern of unsuccessful attempted political reforms and settlements between Britain, Stormont and nationalists (the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements) which continued in the face of retributive violence between the PIRA and Protestant paramilitary organizations. The PIRA changed strategies in 1992, as it began to attack on the British continent. In April of 1992 the PIRA detonated two bombs in London, causing £700 million in damages and later attacked the financial district of the city causing over £1 billion in estimated damages.83 Back-door peace talks and on and off PIRA ceasefires continued throughout the coming years until 1998 when a government power-sharing agreement called the ³Good Friday Agreement´ was approved by the parties involved.84 Sporadic minor acts of terrorist violence have continued to the present. 80 81 Kennedy-Pipe, 60. McKittrick and McVea, 82-83. 82 Ibid, 87. 83 Ibid, 181. 84 Ibid, 220-223. 28 Analysis Cultural and Religious Factors: A brief recap of cultural conditions that can predispose societies to the use of terrorism follows. As explained previously, multiple theorists attempt to attribute cultural factors such as a common ethnicity or religion to terrorism. One aspect of the argument explains that terrorism can be viewed as a last resort for groups after its members¶ ethnicity or religion have been confronted with a history of inequality, oppression, unfair treatment, lack of freedom, threats toward their group or violence.85 The shared sense of injustice among the members of the certain ethnic or religious group creates feelings of anger and hostility toward those who are seen as the progenitor of oppression. The divide between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland is an example of how feelings of discrimination and oppression can build and create divisions between religious and ethnic groups. Discrimination and the relative deprivation of Catholics led to initial antagonism, while later state and Protestant violence against peaceful civil rights movements maintained the perception of an oppressive relationship between the two. In the case of terrorism and violence in Northern Ireland, cultural aspects were important in sustaining feelings of resentment from generation to generation. However, the initial feelings of resentment toward Britain and the more recent feelings of resentment that led to Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 85 29 IRA violence were a result of grievances stemming from relative inequalities in the economic and political dynamics within the country. As these feelings of injustice and frustration are internalized over extended periods of time, they appear more likely to precipitate the development of groups willing to use violence to change their shared experience. These groups were and are sustained by the continued grievances felt by the people represented within the larger population. Additionally, religion was and is used in the region as motivation to promote and give justification for violent actions of both Catholic and Protestant military groups. Theorists of the Northern-Irish conflict such as David Rapoport for example, claim that religions have ³violence-reducing and violence-producing dimensions´ that inspire ³total loyalties´ which are used to justify war.86 Richard Rose espouses a similar argument when stating that religion creates scenarios based on ³non-bargainable absolute value´ and that the ³history of the Roman Catholic Church and of various Protestant denominations illustrates the impossibility of compromise when transcendental and worldly values are in conflict´.87 In the case of religion as it relates to Northern Ireland, much of the recent literature produced has argued that it may play a role in producing conditions that produce terrorism, but other factors are more influential. McGarry and O¶Leary argue that the conflict was not fundamentally religious and point to the fact that the two religiously differentiated communities are also divided by ³broader cultural differences, national allegiances, histories of antagonistic encounters, and marked differences in economic and political power´.88 Furthermore, Fionnuala O¶Connor argues that religions in the conflict in Northern Ireland David Rapoport, Some General Observations on Religion and Violence , Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3 (1991), 118-140. 87 Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective, (London: Faber and Faber), 1971:248. 88 John McGarry and Brendan O Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.), 1995:172-174. 86 30 actually provided channels for different forms of nationalism. O¶Connor asserts that the ³loudest voices in each of the two main groups have always told the weakest that they risk destruction from µthe other side¶, destruction meaning loss of identity´.89 The cultural argument is not enough to fully explain why some turn to terrorism in this case. In Northern Ireland cultural and religious conditions within the society helped increase the spread of fanaticism and community support for the use of terrorism and violence. The question arises as to why some living within the same culture choose a peaceful option while others adopt more violent tendencies. An important question to ask is why the Catholics and Protestants in the United States and many other countries across the world are able to coexist but are not capable of doing so in this specific community. It seems acceptable then to believe that cultural factors can contribute to the development of terrorism but additional catalysts appear to be necessary in order to provide the further insight required to explain why violence is used by some and not by others. The next two sections will discuss economic and political conditions which may prove instructive in identifying why terrorism occurs. Economic Factors: Theorists in general, hotly contest the role of poverty as a potential contributor to terrorism. Some argue that economic factors play only an indirect role in explaining terrorism. Others continue to believe that economics are highly influential and can be significant contributors in creating a frustrated and unsatisfied base for possible recruitment Fionnuala O Connor, Breaking the Bonds: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company), 2002: 236. 89 31 into terrorist organizations. Both the theories providing evidence for and against economics¶ role in terrorism are included to provide contextual balance to the argument. The poor economic conditions in Northern Ireland and the relative economic difficulties for Catholics (in comparison to Protestants) were primary grievances held throughout the 20th century. Housing discrimination and the ensuing segregation of communities resulted in ³no-go´ zones for the British security forces. In these areas it is difficult for forces to enforce the rule of law. Based on Map-1 contrived from data in the 1991 census of religious distribution in Belfast, it is apparent that isolated communities of Catholics and Protestants exist. The lack of security resulting from the retributive violence of two isolated but closely arranged communities makes economic improvement in the area difficult; as business and commerce suffer from the instability of periodic explosions and killing. Education in Northern Ireland is still segregated today, in spite of attempts to integrate the two religious groups. The first integrated school was not opened until 1981 and according to the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) there were fifty total integrated schools as of 2003. Of these schools eighteen were colleges and thirty-two were primary schools. These schools had 16,000 students, or five percent of the total student population. This statistic is important, since ninety-five percent of students are still attending non-integrated schools.90 When one considers that Protestants were in control of Northern Ireland¶s economic resources from ³the time of partition until the 1960s´ consideration of the economic arguments mentioned becomes paramount in this case. Protestants were systematically selected for eighty to eighty-five percent of positions in the civil service, as well as the 90 Fionnuala Mckeena and Martin Melaugh, Education in Northern Ireland. Available on the web at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/educ.htm 32 private sphere, while discrimination was established through hiring practices (as Protestants were dominant in industry and the major agricultural organizations across the region.) 91 Further, between 1911 and 1971 the proportion of unskilled Catholics increased, while the proportion of unskilled Protestants decreased, with unemployment much higher for Catholics.92 The relative divergence between Catholic and Protestant employment rates was fairly constant between these periods through the present. From 1971 to 1985 Catholic men were two and a half times as likely as Protestant men to be unemployed.93 For example, from 1983-1984 the Catholic male unemployment rate was thirty-five percent (compared to a Protestant unemployment rate of fifteen percent.)94 In 1991 the census found that the same unemployment rate relationship between Catholics and Protestants was 28.4 compared to 13.9 percent and in 1992 was 24 to 10 percent.95 In addition, between 1986-1987 and 1988-1991 it was apparent that when compared with Protestants, Catholics represented a greater percentage of those with the lowest total gross household income (Table-1).96 Moreover, the average gross weekly household income for Northern Ireland has been and continues to be the lowest in the United Kingdom. This is illustrated in Table-2, which measures periods from 1980-1981, 1994-1995 and 1996-1997.97 The relative inequality and discrimination which is demonstrated by these figures could create frustration and tension among Catholics and must be considered as an important condition that predisposed the Northern Irish society to terrorism. 91 Ruane and Todd, 153-154. Ibid, 156. David J. Smith et al, Inequality in Northern Ireland. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1991. 94 Martin Melaugh. (1995). Majority-Minority Differentials: Unemployment, Housing and Health . In: Seamus Dunn, (ed). Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, (London: Macmillan Press), Ch.9. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Table-2, accessible on the web at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/income.htm 93 92 33 Based on the data and historical account mentioned above, it is apparent that the theories presented within the economic factors section of the introduction can be confirmed, or at the least, cannot be ruled out. Mark Juergensmeyer¶s argument that the low prices of homes in certain areas contributing to a high percentage of frustrated young individuals living in concentrated areas (as a result of economic necessity) is conceivable in this case. Government housing discrimination also contributed to the segregation of Catholic and Protestant communities, but the relative income distributions previously mentioned would play a contributing role as well. If Catholics are unemployed more frequently and have lower average weekly earnings, it would be difficult for them to afford the same housing as Protestants. The concentration of many individuals with economic woes could have led to the communal development of desperation or anger (directed toward the British or Northern Irish governments) as Protestants seemed to have a comparatively better situation. A similar theory (that is confirmed) is Ted Gurr¶s argument that relative deprivation and structural inequalities add to resentment and political violence, as one group enjoys more societal advantages or opportunities than another. The gap between what Catholics received and what they believed they should receive was great, since many students obtained an education, but then were not rewarded with employment in the best fields or could not find a job at all. These frustrations with the economic environment (when multiplied across the majority of the group) provide an explanation for the oppositional civil rights movement that developed in the 1960s and terrorist movement that was initiated when violence was used against them. 34 The data also confirms Kruegar and Laitin¶s claims that terrorism comes from countries which suffer from political oppression, while the targets are countries that are economically more successful. The IRA attacked both British cities and Protestant communities which were economically more successful than Catholics. The British ruling government and the Protestant representatives in their communities represented the negative relative relationship that existed between the groups. Table-2 helps to explain why the IRA would engage in attacks against those within Britain and Northern Ireland but did not attack other countries within the United Kingdom. The relative economic success of Scotland or Wales to Northern Ireland is much less than the Protestants within their own communities, or the British themselves. Jessica Stern¶s outlook regarding the role that government-permitted unemployment (through discrimination in education and employment) can play in promoting terrorism is applicable in the Northern Irish case as well. Stern states that some countries may lack the funds necessary to provide public education to all students.98 Stern argues that the quality and type of education a student receives is important in determining future economic success. Although Stern focuses mainly on the preaching of a ³narrow and violent version of Islam´ which can lead to economically unstable outcomes, the same principles are present in the mainly religious backgrounds of schools within Northern Ireland.99 When ninety-five percent of students are segregated into religious schools, it is difficult for a common culture and understanding between Catholics and Protestants to develop (as it has in other societies.) The arguments of Bueno de Mesquita and Hassan cannot be ruled out in the Northern Irish case, as data mentioned above demonstrates that the country was the poorest of those 98 Jessica Stern, Pakistan s Jihad Culture . Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2002. 99 Stern, 122. 35 within the United Kingdom from 1968-1999. It is possible that the many individuals that previously engaged in terrorism but eventually became leaders in politics and Northern Irish society used violence as a result of poverty in their country, rather than their own personal scarcity. Research focused on individual terrorist backgrounds involved in the conflict is ongoing. Research of this kind is beyond the parameters of a chapter constrained by length restrictions. However, it cannot be ruled out that screening of incoming applicants occurred in an attempt to choose the best possible for the ranks of the terrorist group. For the same reasons, the arguments of Krueger and Maleckova regarding the positive relationship of education and poverty to participation in terrorist activities cannot be ruled out. This is especially the case given the fact that many leaders (such as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness) were educated and eventually became leaders in the political realm after peace agreements were ratified. The close ties of the terrorism of the PIRA to the political Sinn Fein movement assures that many were both educated and more well to do than the rest of the Catholic population. The arguments of Bueno de Mesquita and Hassan explain how the confirmation of this theory would not rule out the confirmation of the other theories previously mentioned. It is personally intuitive that the arguments in favor of economic troubles contributing to terrorism are particularly convincing. The numbers may point to unsubstantial results when the issue of the income level of a society is raised in some cases, but that alone does not indicate that the effects of poverty are not influential. I agree that the direct cause of terrorism may not of necessity be linked to whether any individual is living in poverty or wealth, since some leaders and members of terrorist groups can be extremely wealthy. 36 However, one must take into account that ³militias recruit from the ranks of restive, unemployed youths who are easily seduced into the criminal activities that support terrorism.´ 100 So even though there may be disparity between the economic status of leaders and followers, they still may share the similar feelings of frustration, indignity, or oppression held by their friends and family (who have not been able to escape the problems that arise from poor economic conditions.) Moreover, one must always consider the potential for comparatively wealthy movement leaders to manipulate the deprived substrata, either for initial personal gain or to maintain the personal position required to direct the implementation of strategy. It is also necessary to consider the political arguments that help explain how the inability of Catholics to change poor economic conditions peacefully could predispose the society to the use of terrorism. The next section will evaluate political theories in relation to Northern Ireland and the terrorism experienced in the region. Political Factors: The next section discusses theories presented in the introduction which develop an argument for the role of political conditions in predisposing societies to the use of terrorism. It is apparent that these arguments are applicable to the case of Northern Ireland. Despite the attempts of the British to provide security, stability, and possible alternative solutions to the problems that arose in Northern Ireland, history shows that feelings of discrimination and injustice developed in the political relationships between communities over a protracted period of time. Andrew Natsios, Fighting Terror with Aid: Underlying Conditions that Foster Terrorism , Harvard Review, (Fall 2004). 100 37 The Government of Ireland Act, the decision in 1923 to abolish proportional representation in favor of a plurality voting system, the 1922 Special Powers Act, the Education Act of 1930, the use of violence to repress the 1960s Catholic civil rights movement and a long list of other institutionalized discriminatory practices in the society are indicators of policies that created opposition to the government in Northern Ireland. Constant discrimination and policies that reinforced the Catholic minority group¶s inferior position in society (when added to repression of peaceful movements) led to feelings of frustration and oppression. Catholics also had a fear of marginalization, as the best and majority of jobs went to Protestants. Protestants feared the lack of security that the IRA created and the possibility of a loss of relative power in the area. The presence of British troops and a Protestant police force created feelings of an oppressive outside force controlling the country (which for some would rationalize the need for the situation to be addressed through violence.) This combination of factors led to economic deprivation within the Irish Catholic communities living in Northern Ireland. The circular effect of the political situation and relative economic disparities between communities fueled protests and violence for decades. Based on the historical accounts above, all theories in this section can be confirmed in this case. According to Ehud Sprinzak, ³terrorism implies a crisis of legitimacy´ and ³since terrorism never emerges overnight, the crisis of legitimacy unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society and the regime.´101 Within the Northern Irish community, Catholics developed negative attitudes toward the ruling British and Protestant power in government as a result of discrimination and feelings of injustice. 101 Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 38 Over time this sentiment definitely became embedded in the ³nation¶s folklore, historical legends, literature and daily conversation´ but did not immediately result in terrorism.102 The terrorism of the PIRA only began after the Loyalist and army violence directed toward the peaceful civil rights protests of Catholics in the 1960s. The violence from the police force of Northern Ireland and subsequently the British troops could have delegitimized the government and its ability to protect the people in the eyes of the Catholic minority. Robert Pape¶s argument regarding the use suicide terrorism against democracies to achieve territorial goals is not directly apparent in this case since suicide attacks were not intentionally utilized. However, the PIRA did use a campaign of terrorist attacks against the population of Britain and Northern Ireland to achieve specific political and territorial goals. This argument explains why the terrorist campaign has to date ceased (for the most part) after the Good Friday government power sharing agreement in 1999 gave political concessions that includes Catholics in the decision making process. The focus on inclusion of Catholics into the police force and lack of British troops also demonstrates how a diminished level of the perception of an outside oppressive force can help to alleviate a condition that Pape believes can predispose affected societies to the use of terrorism. Also confirmed is Alberto Abadie¶s theory that concludes that the level of political rights, the amount of fractionalization, as well as geography can be persuasive stimuli in the development of terrorism. 103 For Abadie, it is apparent that the inability of the state to enforce the law in certain areas is instrumental in the creation and sustainability of certain terrorist movements. Alan Kruegar comes to a somewhat similar conclusion; proper law enforcement is necessary to avoid having criminal activities take place. He also adds that 102 103 Ibid, 59. Alberto Abadie, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, The American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.2 (May, 2006): 50-56. 39 terrorism, rather than being a response to ³low market opportunities´, is in fact a result of ³long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration.´ The topography of Northern Ireland itself did not directly separate religious groups from a more moderate majority. However, economic circumstances, discriminatory housing practices and separate schools helped segregate and isolate Catholics and Protestant communities. This separation continues to allow some bias and foster the development of irrational ideas about the opposite group. Misunderstanding of ³the other´ allows for the sustainability of feelings of indignation and the maintenance of continued isolation. As previously mentioned, the isolation of communities made it difficult (for a mainly Protestant force) to engage in law enforcement in Catholic areas without risking violence against them. Crimes of the PIRA against fellow Catholics were not enforced and violence throughout the region was obviously present. The structural theories already presented have all been confirmed and relevant in the case of Northern Ireland. However, in order to understand the conflict and terrorism of the IRA, it is also necessary to account for the role that psychological conditions can play in predisposing societies to the use of terrorism. Psychological Factors: The last section of this chapter discusses theories regarding psychology and group dynamics. As was formerly indicated, there are few theorists that disregard psychological factors (or the power of individual emotions, relationships, history and societal inclusion in contributing to terrorism) completely. This section confirms the role of group dynamics and rational choice theories in relation to Northern Ireland. 40 Abrahms and Crenshaw argue that engaging in terrorism is a group activity in which interactions involving intimate relationships among a small number of people take place and that this can be an important factor in determining terrorist behavior. 104 According to this approach, individuals participate in terrorist organizations for the social solidarity they can obtain to combat feelings of alienation, rather than merely the political agenda to which the group adheres.105 From personal first-hand experiences spent with ex-terrorists in Northern Ireland, it is apparent to me that many joined paramilitary and terrorist groups to feel connected to an important cause; their friends or relatives were in the organization and they could experience greater economic success than if they solely participated within the traditional economy. Hoffman and Pape argue that acts of terrorism are rational decisions made by groups and individuals in order to gain supporters, coerce opponents, or earn employment outside the options available within the normal market. Terrorism therefore is not a result of ³crazy´, irrational thinking.106 These theorists in particular believe that terrorists are inherently rational in an elemental way, since they plan operations in order to shock and intimidate the public of a target country and through the attention they receive through the media, by using violent acts. 107 Hoffman expands by stating that terrorists plan and execute acts of violence while taking into account their goals, available resources, capabilities and the ³target audience´ of their actions. 108 104 Martha Crenshaw, ³The Causes of Terrorism,´ Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Max Abrahms, ³What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,´ International Security, Vol.32, No.4 (Spring 2008): 78-105. 105 Abrahms , 94-96. 106 Bruce Hoffman, The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology, Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2002 and Pape, 344-347.. 107 Hoffman, 63-64, and Pape, 344-347. 108 Hoffman, 64. 41 In Northern Ireland the use of terrorism seems to be a rational (albeit horrific) choice, given the fact that peaceful methods were unsuccessful and throughout history, traditional methods of warfare used by Irish armies were repeatedly defeated. When access to jobs and wealth are denied by the entrenched societal structure and security forces of the government, it is rational for a person faced with a choice between starvation or violence to turn to the latter. Group-think (and specifically the hope for retaliation with violence) as a result of loss and injury to family and friends was also apparent in Northern Ireland.109 Joining a terrorist organization was seen for some as a way to protect their community and get revenge for injuries of loved ones. As violence of this nature ensued over decades, people within the IRA were admired for the values they claimed to represent, which also helped fuel the continuation of membership over time. 110 Conclusions of the Northern Irish Case: With so many contributory factors that theorists believe have the capability to influence conditions that promote terrorism, it is difficult to choose an all-encompassing, singular theory that can explain every scenario across all individuals or all groups in the case of Northern Ireland. Instead, a comprehensive approach to the production of terrorism must include a synthesis of multiple conditions that developed within this environment over time, which predisposed the society to the use of terrorism. This is particularly apparent when the theories are able to provide numerous examples to promote their respective validity. It seems that one of the only ways to observe why 109 Lord Alderice, The individual, the group and the psychology of terrorism, International Review of Psychiatry, June 2007, Vol. 19: 201-209 110 Ibid, 202. 42 terrorism evolves in certain countries and among certain populations is to analyze different movements that currently exist. In following chapters, I will analyze the terrorist movements that developed within Algeria and Chechnya in anticipation of finding similarities and differences between the factors that contributed to the adoption of violent strategies. . 43 THESIS CH. 2, CASE STUDY: WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS WITHIN ALGERIA WHICH PREDISPOSED THE REGION TO THE TERRORISM OF THE FLN AND AQIM? Introduction: This chapter will discuss the multiple underlying conditions theorists believe predisposed some to the use of terrorism in Algeria. The previous chapter of this thesis analyzed the underlying conditions within Northern Ireland which predisposed that society to the use of terrorism. The theories presented were based on the arguments derived from the five working groups devoted to understanding the underlying conditions of terrorism at the March 2005, Madrid Summit. These groups included the top experts from around the world who are knowledgeable on the categories of terrorism resulting from cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious factors. The present case study will use this methodology to test the same arguments explained and evaluated in the previous chapter. This chapter begins with a historical section dedicated to Algeria and the terrorist movements that developed within it to provide a baseline for analysis of the theories cited. Terrorist groups mentioned within this history of the country include the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) which eventually developed into the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM itself is relatively newly formed, with its origins stemming from the GSPC, which developed in the 1990s. The recent group is therefore an interesting case to consider when determining the underlying conditions within societies that lead to terrorism. A brief history will help those unfamiliar with the terrorism in Algeria to better understand the underlying conditions which predisposed the region to violent attacks and opposition. 44 History: 19th Century: Establishment of Algerian Territory and French Colonization The territory that constitutes Algeria today did not truly begin to take shape until 1529 when the Ottoman Empire took control of Algiers.111 The Ottomans established Algeria as a feudal type state under which a tribute was sent to Istanbul in exchange for the sultan¶s political support of the head of state and chief military officer of the Turkish military elite (the Dey) who was elected by a council. In addition, a two-part Muslim judicial system was used in which the local population adhered to the Malikite school of law while the Turkish elite followed Hanafite law. The Dey ruled over Algiers through a continual Turkish military presence that collected taxes, while civil servants comprised of soldiers¶ sons and women occupied administrative positions.112 Beyond the city limits, Algeria was split into three regions which were led by a governor (bey) and assisted by lieutenants (calipha) who brought taxes to Algiers, judges (cadis), and tax collectors (caids).113 The sea was controlled by the corsairs who functioned within the country, seized ships and took over one million Europeans prisoner in the seventeenth century to sell into slavery.114 In 1816 the British bombarded the city to put an end to the enslavement practices, which led to the Dey needing to increase taxes of those living in the countryside and the subsequent unsuccessful revolts of locals under Sufi leadership.115 111 112 Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2007. Ibid, 22. 113 Ibid, 22. 114 Ibid, 23. 115 Ibid, 24. 45 France invaded and began its colonization of Algeria in 1830. The French Foreign Legion was established in 1831 in eastern Algeria and was used to enforce a number of tax principles similar to the Ottoman ruled society. In response, a jihad against unbelievers and resistance to the French presence in the region was led by a man named Abd el-Kader (until 1847 when he surrendered.)116 In 1865 the policy of sénatus-consulte was implemented, which stated that Muslims would be governed by Islamic law rather than the French civil code. In order to become a French citizen, Muslims had to give away their right to be governed this way, which is considered an apostolic act to those who follow the religion.117 Increased taxes and the reliance on the old Ottoman based system for payments resulted in the death of over three-hundred thousand Muslims in Algeria (due to starvation) in 1867.118 In 1870 Jewish residents of the country were given full citizenship while the local Algerian population was not included.119 In 1873 the Warnier law divided communal land into individual plots so it could be sold with greater ease and efficiency. However, from 1871 until 1898 it was not Muslims who acquired this land. Instead, it was the French settlers who purchased about two and a half million acres of the available land.120 In 1881 France began to administer Algeria as part of its own country, as six deputies were sent from Algeria to the National Assembly in Paris. However, Muslims were excluded, while French male settlers were given the right to vote. In addition, when determining local council positions, only five per cent of the male Muslim population was Ibid, 29. Ibid, 30. 118 Ibid, 31. 119 Ibid, 35. 120 Ibid, 34. 117 116 46 allowed to vote until 1919, following which, the percentage could not surpass one-quarter.121 The Code de l¶Indigénat was also passed in 1881, which included harsh reprimands for Muslims who were rude to or spoke ill of colonial officials or the government of France.122 20th Century: Build up to War of Independence As the Second World War began, Algerians joined the French in great numbers, as over one-hundred fifty thousand men became a part of the French Army of Africa and fought in Tunisia, Italy, France and Indochina.123 Upon completion of the war, the Algerian veterans were rewarded with medals, pensions and government jobs but were not given French citizenship or equal rights to French Algerians.124 In 1945 Algerian nationalist demonstrations for equal rights collapsed into riots, which resulted in the slaughtering of French families and thousands of deaths, as the government responded with force against the movement.125 A war for Algerian independence began in 1954 and continued for seven and a half years, until 1962.126 The Font de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was the leading opposition against the French during the war and became the country¶s only legal political party upon winning its independence.127 Fanatical violence spread at the hands of the FLN for the first two years of the war, which resulted in more killing of French civilians living in the country. In return, the French army gave weapons to French civilians and clamped down on the Muslim Ibid, 33. Ibid, 33. 123 Colonel Gilles Martin, War in Algeria: The French Experience , Military Review (July-August 2005): 51-57. 124 Ibid, 52. 125 Ibid, 52. 126 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003: Algeria, 92. 127 Ibid, 92. 122 121 47 population through the institution of check points and inspections and the practice of arrests, interrogations, detentions and other forms of repression.128 Mid-20th Century: The terrorism of the FLN: In 1957 the FLN began a bombing campaign within the city of Algiers that was met by an order (from the French government to the army) to reestablish order using any means necessary. The 10th Parachute Division began an occupation of the city and in a few weeks had established control through a complete dismantling of the FLN. 129 Negotiations began in 1958 as the President of France, Charles de Gaulle proposed the Constantine Plan (which consisted of $4 billion in investments to ³transform´ Algeria within five years) with over five-hundred thousand acres of land being transferred to Muslims, four-hundred thousand jobs created in areas of energy and industry and two-thirds of Muslim children enrolling in school.130 Insurrection continued however, as negotiations took place for three years until the Evian Accords were signed by the French government and the FLN in March of 1962. The Evian Accords allowed the French to lease military sites, have access to the gas and oil within the Sahara region and French Algerians were guaranteed property and rights. On the other hand, the Algerians were given economic assistance from the French and were also given promises that the Constantine plan would continue for three years.131 In the weeks Martin, 53. Ibid, 53. 130 Jeffrey Byrn, Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s , Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June 2009): 427-447. 131 Ibid, 431. 129 128 48 following the agreement, one million French Algerians immigrated to southern France while one-hundred fifty thousand of those who stayed behind were killed by the FLN.132 The French Ministry of Defense assesses the total numbers of deaths and injuries at 30,672 dead and 56,962 French soldiers wounded, in addition to some 3,500 Muslims who fought for the French. The FLN lost over 141,000 in combat and 12,000 to internal suppressions, while 66,000 Muslim (in addition to the 150,000 killed after the signing of the Evian Accords) and 2,788 French civilians were killed during the course of the war.133 Ahmed Ben Bella of the FLN was chosen to be president of Algeria following independence in 1962 and almost immediately began a period of nationalization of Frenchowned industries and enterprises.134 Only a few years later (in 1965) the first president of the independent Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, was the target of a coup d¶état carried out by the vice-premier and minister of defense Colonel Houari Boumédienne. Ben Bella was arrested and put in prison for fifteen years (with little contestation) as Boumédienne took control of the government.135 As the country¶s leader, the Colonel instituted the National Charter of 1976 which confirmed Islam as the state religion and reaffirmed a commitment to fight underdevelopment and build a modern and successful economy.136 Boumédienne also continued to increase socialist based economic policies, invested heavily in industrialization and nationalized the oil industry within the country over the next decade, until his death in Martin, 54. Ibid, 54. 134 Byrn,432. 135 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2001. 136 Ibid,147. 133 132 49 1978.137 The government was turned over to Colonel Chadli Bendjedid by the FLN in 1979. Throughout the 1980s prices of basic necessities and goods rose, unemployment increased significantly and the population moved from rural areas into the city, which put pressure on the government and the people.138 1980s Through 2006: Food Riots, Political Conflict, Civil War and the Initial Terrorism Movement of the GIA and GSPC In October 1988, demonstrations and riots began in protest of the existing economic situation across the country and the government¶s plan to remove a subsidy on bread.139 These demonstrations resulted in damage from vandalism across major cities and were eventually met with force from the army. After a week of riots, five hundred were dead and thousands of arrests were made.140 The mass uprisings brought about thoughts of constitutional and systemic governmental changes. New articles within the constitution allowed for the introduction of forty-four parties in the year following what came to be known as ³Black October´ and multi-party elections were scheduled to take place in June of 1991.141 The elections were delayed until December of 1991 but their results were somewhat lopsided. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) obtained 188 seats, the Front de Force Socialiste (FFS) gained 25 seats and the FLN received 18 seats in the first round of voting for Ibid, 150-180. Ibid, 180-210. 139 Jonathan Farley, The Maghreb s Islamic Challenge , The World Today, Vol. 47, No. 8/9 (August- September, 1991): 148-151. 140 Stora, 195-197. 141 Ibid, 199. 138 137 50 the legislative body.142 Consequently the current government cancelled the second round of the legislative elections and banned the FIS from further participation in the political system.143 The cancellation of the elections pushed the country¶s population to civil unrest as an internal war broke out that would continue for the rest of the decade and claim over onehundred thousand lives.144 Those who were involved in the civil war were essentially broken up into groups based on class and political perspective. In one camp was the middle class, whose members gave allegiance to the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) which was the army of the FIS and to moderate Islamic groups such as Hamas. The Algerian military and government looked to the upper class for its support and continued its rule. The third and final group consisted of the young and poor from the cities who tended to side with the more radical Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).145 The GIA became the most influential group, as it surpassed the FIS over the course of 1993 and 1994 in both capacity for influence and membership, as it used violence to target those affiliated with the government or army.146 The GIA targeted France as a result of its support for the Algerian military government and secular culture as well. The group¶s most notable international attacks outside of its own country took place in 1994, as it hijacked an Air France plane and in 1995 when it bombed two Paris Metro stations.147 As was described Ibid, 210. Economist Intelligence Unit, 92. 144 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), Ch.11, 254-275, 2002. 145 Ibid, 254. 146 Kepel, 263. 147 Lauren, Vriens, Armed Islamic Group , Council on Foreign Relations (May, 2009). Available online at http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists. 143 142 51 earlier, the group caused tremendous civil disruption and instability throughout the civil war, as it killed thousands of civilians and innocents living within Algeria. Algeria¶s President Bouteflika described the most current figures of the devastation of the war in 2005. He claimed that during the 1990s over one-hundred fifty-thousand people lost their lives, $30 billion was lost in infrastructure and material damage, there were up to eighteen-thousand forced disappearances, ten-thousand abductions by terrorist groups, and over one-hundred thousand displaced people.148 These figures explain why the GIA lost a great deal of credibility in the eyes of the Algerian population. The majority of the group was forced to merge into the GSPC in 1998 as a result of its negative effects on the economy and the insecurity of the every-day person over such an extended period of time. The subsequent movement of the GSPC and its transition into AQIM developed over the course of the next decade and continues to promote violence and instability in the Maghreb region and around the world. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb evolved into its current organizational form from a dissident faction of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The GIA originated in 1992 after Algeria¶s military regime annulled the elections in parliament (when it appeared the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would win and take control of power within the government.) 149 The GIA began an insurrection in protest against the Algerian state. The GIA mainly targeted civilians and government workers who were not sympathetic to their cause, which resulted in massacres of entire House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, Hearing, Algeria s Struggle Against Terrorism, (March 3, 2005): 12. 149 Andrew Hansen. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Council on Foreign Relations, (July 2009):1-4. 148 52 villages and tens of thousands of Algerians.150 The group¶s insurrection led (in total) to over 150,000 civilian, military, and political deaths throughout the 1990s.151 Due to the brutality of the violence inflicted by the GIA, the group lost credibility in the eyes of the Algerian people, forcing most members in 1998 to join a group that promised to continue to fight the state without the unnecessary targeting of civilians; the GSPC.152 According to data collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), GSPC is responsible for seventy-two terrorist attacks, three-hundred twenty-six deaths and one-hundred eighty-nine injuries in Algeria and Mali from its inception until 2006.153 2006 to the Present: The Terrorism of AQIM The GSPC officially became affiliated with al-Qaeda (AQ) in September of 2006 and changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in January 2007. 154 According to START data, from September 2006 until the end of September 2008, AQIM was responsible for eighty-seven deaths and ninety-six injuries, including bombings of UN and Algerian government buildings in 2007, which killed forty-one.155 In 2009 attacks continued across Algeria, while AQIM expanded its territory into the Sahel region (a mostly desert and thinly populated region that exists within Algeria, a small portion of Libya, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, (August, 2010): Ch. 6, Terrorist Organizations, accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. 151 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, Hearing, Algeria s Struggle Against Terrorism, (March 3, 2005): 1-43. 152 Ibid, 1. 153 START Global Terrorism Database accessed at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search 154 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, (August, 2010): Ch. 6, Terrorist Organizations, accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. 155 START Global Terrorism Database accessed at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search 150 53 Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad) carrying out multiple kidnappings that resulted in millions of dollars in ransom.156 Activities over the course of 2010 and the beginnings of 2011 have shown that AQIM is, and will continue to be a persistent threat to the region. These numbers however, fail to fully illustrate the slowly increasing capacity of the group. It will help to provide some perspective on the group¶s rising potential by relaying some of its most recent, notable actions. In September 2010, night raids on a French nuclear service firm in Nigeria resulted in the kidnapping of seven employees from a secure facility. Troops were engaged by AQIM fighters only a few days later 1,200 kilometers away in Mauritanian and a few weeks earlier a military barracks in Nema, Mauritania was attacked be a suicide bomber, injuring several soldiers.157 In January of 2011 an AQIM member threw a bomb at the French embassy in Mali which was followed within days by a kidnapping of two French nationals. In February 2011, three terrorists and eight Mauritanian troops were injured when two truck-bombs were detonated in Nouakchott in an attempt to assassinate the Mauritanian president.158 Since its inception in 2006, AQIM has received over $70 million in ransoms from kidnappings and has begun to obtain further funds through drug trafficking.159 AQIM members were recently arrested in Morocco as a network of thirty-four attempted to smuggle six-hundred kilograms of cocaine, worth over $60 million into the Maghreb region.160 Camille Tawil, The Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from within Jihadist Circles, (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation), 2009. 157 Mobido Goita, West Africa s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM s Sahelian Strategy, Africa Security Brief, Vol. 11, (February, 2001). 158 Ibid, 2. 159 Ibid, 4. 160 Ibid, 4. 156 54 With funds of this magnitude continuing to funnel into the organization, it seems likely that more complex plans and more attempts at highly significant targets will be undertaken in the future. This is particularly evident when one considers that the group¶s stated goals include not only the overthrow of Algeria¶s secular government (in order to establish an Islamic caliphate) but also to attack France and the United States for their colonialism and perceived leadership in a crusade against Muslims.161 This foundation of Algerian history will help to evaluate the theories previously elaborated on within this thesis. The next section of this chapter will examine and test multiple theories on the issue of terrorism. In order to rule out or verify certain explanations in the case of Algerian terrorism, this chapter will examine the arguments developed in the introduction and last chapter. This analysis will begin with theories explaining how cultural and religious conditions could predispose societies to terrorism before testing those from economics, politics and psychology. Analysis Cultural and Religious Factors: To reiterate, cultural theories stem from arguments which indicate that violence comes as a last resort in the face of historical and persistent inequality, oppression and unfair treatment, lack of political rights, threats or even violence toward a specific ethnic or religious group.162 As a result of a commonly held suppressed status within the society or 161 162 Hansen, 2. Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3 (Spring/Summer, 2005):50-68. 55 group, a culture emerges with ³shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths and traditions´ that can unite the people and ignite violent behavior when the conditions conducive to the adoption of fanatic doctrine mentioned above are present.163 Multiple, overlapping examples of this theory are available for the examination of Algeria. The pirating traditions of the corsairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman rule from 1529-1830, the effects of French colonization from 1830-1962 and the Algerian¶s war of independence, Afghanistan¶s war against the Soviet Union, the Algerian Civil War from 1992-1999 and multiple other flash points in history shaped the culture of the Algerian people. As exhibited through the history of the cases of terrorism and violence examined in the previous section, it is evident that these aspects were important in maintaining a divide between the local population, French Algerians and European immigrants. However, if one considers the underlying reasons behind the divisions that were created in the original colonization in 1830 (lasting until the end of the civil war in the late 1990s) it is evident that relative economic and political inequalities (and structure) played a greater role in creating resentment and fueling opposition movements. Obvious cultural divisions existed between the majority of the Muslim population and the European settlers, but there were no violent uprisings or terrorist movements for over one-hundred years following France¶s initial colonization. During this relatively peaceful period, economic and political inequalities were established between these populations so that the Muslim Jeffrey Ross, Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards A Causal Model, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1993): 317-329. 163 56 population developed grievances over time that predisposed the society to fanatic religious doctrine and nationalistic ideology. These grievances did not appear as a result of differences in customs or religion but instead developed as European settlers gained relative economic prosperity and used this to increase political power, leaving little for the Muslim majority. At first glance, it would appear that this situation amounted to a clash between two different types of civilizations living in close proximity to one another. Closer inspection however, points to the more logical conclusion that some citizens (regardless of cultural differences) would hope to break free from the perceived economic or political oppression of one group over another with the use of violence, after peaceful methods had proven futile. As these grievances began to multiply and attempts at political change were met with governmental repression, religious leaders attempted to use these grievances as a catalyst to promote fanatical doctrine as an agent of change through violence (in the name of God.) It is therefore difficult to ignore the role that shared beliefs and religion played in the violence exhibited in the war of independence and particularly in the period immediately prior to the civil war of the 1990s. Religion was used to unite the economically and politically marginalized who shared grievances (against those in power) irrespective of their religious beliefs. In Algeria over the past century, groups such as the FLN, GIA and GSPC emerged through the promotion of fanatical doctrine (following times of economic and political hardship and inequality.) Since the majority of the disadvantaged population of Algeria was Muslim, the Islamic groups were able to use culturally shared elements within the religion to 57 promote and unite those with grievances. AQIM and al-Qaeda in general use many commonly accepted elements (such as goals to eliminate Western secular influence in the community and in government or upholding the laws of God) to appeal to followers throughout the world, even though most would not promote the use of violence against innocent people to obtain these goals.164 In Algeria in the mid twentieth century for example, the nationalist movement for independence from France became a call for Muslims to liberate their faith from the economic and political oppression imposed by Christians and Muslim sympathizers working in the government and in key industries.165 Differences in the standard of living between Europeans and Muslims living in Algeria began a process of de facto segregation between the two communities, which made mixing of different cultures and religions infrequent in spite of close proximity.166 As a result of this separation of communities, it was apparent that most Muslim Algerians were not receiving equal treatment to Europeans and (over time) developed a sense of societal inferiority.167 The feelings of economic and political oppression (in addition to the collective inferiority) will be discussed in more detail in later sections of this chapter. It is important to communicate at this point however, that a culture of economic and political inferiority within the majority of the Muslim population grew and played an important role in future actions against the state. In order to better understand the violence witnessed, it is also Alice Lociero and Samuel Sinclair, Creating Young Martyrs: Conditions that Make Dying in a Terrorist Attack Seem Like a Good Idea. (Westport: Praeger Security International and Greenwood Publishing Group), 2008. 165 Jacques Goutor, Algeria and France 1830-1963, (Muncie: Ball State University), 1965. Selection from Ch. 2, Algerian Nationalism: Spontaneous or Imposed? : 17-31. 166 Ibid, 22-23. 167 Ibid, 23. 164 58 necessary to explain other noteworthy causal factors behind the rise of religious fundamentalism prior to the civil war, as well as to the eventual creation of AQIM. After the granting of independence, the government under Ben Bella was concerned with socialist economic policies and attempted to distance itself from the influences of religion. However, when Ben Bella was deposed in 1965, a foundation for Arabization and Islamization was built that would allow these movements to gain wide control over the education and culture of the Algerian people for years to come.168 The school system was ³Arabized´ by making Arabic the official language of the country and by bringing in strictly Arabic speaking teachers to educate (in an attempt to rid Algeria of many of its French aspects.) 169 Many of these teachers came from a radical Islamic group based in Egypt called the Muslim Brotherhood, as they fled from a government crack-down on threats to the country¶s leader, Nasser.170 Fundamentalist Islamic teachers had the potential to affect many of the young people that passed through the school system and could have instilled many of the radical teachings of Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood into their students. This situation provided a basis for the recruitment of young men to become militants for the Islamic cause in Afghanistan in its fight against the Soviet Union from 1979-1989. During this time, many Muslims left Algeria to fight as mujahedeen in Afghanistan, against the Soviet army. By the end of 1980, between three and four thousand Algerians trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan; with a thousand of these soldiers returning to Algeria and an additional thousand continuing to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya, where they Kepel, 161-163. Ibid, 163. 170 Ibid, 163. 169 168 59 established further European networks.171 As the militants returned at different points throughout the war, it became apparent that many had been radicalized during the time spent with their Afghani brethren opposing an ideal form of the secularist enemy.172 The defeat of the Soviet Union inspired many to believe that secular government in general was illegitimate in the face of Islam and that a similar victory could be won against the current secularist Algerian establishment.173 The mujahedeen spread their beliefs and helped train young men in combat upon their arrival in Algeria.174 A freer political environment following the 1989 constitution allowed the war veterans to preach fanatical doctrine in mosques and permitted them to share their military knowledge with great portions of the ³disadvantaged and marginalized youth´.175 In spite of the fact that many were radicalized during this period there was no large outbreak of violence until the cancellation of elections and the dismissal of the FIS. A large number of GIA (and subsequently GSPC/AQIM) members rose out of the ³general disaffection with the political environment of the time´ as moderate Islamic groups were denied their place within the political system in the last two decades of the twentieth century.176 In the case of Algeria, the cultural argument is not enough to fully explain why some initially turned to terrorist activity. The participation of the FIS and the support from the larger Muslim community in the elections of the early 1990s demonstrates that at first, 171 Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: the Trans-nationalization of Domestic Terrorism , ISS Monograph Series, No.144 (June 2008): 32-33. 172 Vriens, 1-2. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Botha, 33. 176 Ibid. 60 the moderate Islam in the country hoped to play a part in the political realm, without reverting to violent tactics. The terrorism generated from the GIA and GSPC did not come only as a result of radical religious doctrine in mosques, schools or returning mujahedeen, but also involves a political aspect; as the Muslim majority was denied representation in the government in 1991. These groups and AQIM initially were predominantly part of a domestic insurgency against Algeria¶s government, with the hope of reinstituting Islam¶s place within the country by establishing a Muslim state through the institution of sharia law.177 However, as GSPC joined the global structure of al-Qaeda to become AQIM, they also adopted its global jihadist doctrine, with the expectation of spreading their influence to other areas of the world.178 The group hopes to attack not only in Northern Africa but also in Western Europe, Iraq and the United States, as it grows into a regional organization recruiting and operating throughout the Maghreb and into Europe.179 In this instance, it is apparent that the religion began to venture into politics as a result of its true representative nature of the people living within the country, rather than in the hope of instituting radical Islamic doctrine. Regardless of the intentions of the movement, a large majority of the population who voted for the FIS felt disillusioned by their role in society (as the military took control and cancelled their choice for government.) This led to the movements of the GIA and GSPC in an attempt to reposition their religion within the government of Algeria. As the movement grew and gained power and influence from al- Hansen, 1. Ibid, 2. 179 Ibid, 2. 178 177 61 Qaeda, broader targets and global jihadi doctrine against secularist governments everywhere have replaced the once domestic insurgency. The next section will first test and discuss the economic conditions which predisposed the country to the use of terrorism before transitioning to a similar test and explanation of political factors. Economic Factors: This section will discuss important aspects of the economic history of Algeria and the theories which attempt to indicate how economic conditions could have aided in the predisposition of this society to terrorism. Prior to the war of independence, economic inequality created destitute living situations for a large portion of the Muslim population. Leaving the political factors aside, from 18301900 ordinances made tribal land, the land of Muslim religious congregations and land without French style titles a part of the public domain.180 Europeans were allowed to cultivate and irrigate areas previously incapable of producing crops. The total number of farms during this period was divided between 22,000 European owned and 630,000 Muslim owned farms. This number seems proportional to the population, given that the number of Muslims living within Algeria was much greater than the number of Europeans. However, closer inspection reveals the existence of a relative marginality; the average European farm was made up of 268 acres while the average Muslim farm was only 11.4 acres.181 180 181 Goutor, 8. Ibid, 8. 62 With such small farms among the population, it became necessary for families to sell most of their products as exports to market rather than conserving some food for times of bad harvest.182 This situation fostered future hardships, as disease and famine spread through the country throughout the 1860s, killing between 200,000 and 500,000 Algerians.183 As French medicine was introduced and disseminated throughout the country between 1856 and 1940, the population of Algeria tripled to six and a half million people. This meant that fewer available tracts of land were vacant for farmers, as only one percent of Algerians had a farm of more than one-hundred hectares by 1930.184 As a result, Algerians were forced to either work as cheap labor on large farms or migrate to the coastal cities, in the hope of finding employment. The situation was even more grim within the cities, as Europeans controlled the commercial and industrial job markets, due to a combination of three factors: A higher percentage of Europeans lived in cities, most industrial jobs were located in cities and the Algerians lacked the education and skilled knowledge to occupy these types of jobs. With rich Europeans ruling the country-side and agricultural sectors, the poorest of Europeans settled in major cities. In 1931 sixty-nine percent of the total population of Algiers, seventy-nine percent of Oran, forty-eight percent of Constantine, and fifty-seven percent of Bône consisted of European and French settlers. 185 This was problematic for the Algerian population since almost all of the country¶s industries were concentrated in these cities. By 1955 there were 26,500 European owned industries, which employed 305,000 182 Charles-Robert Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et La France, (Paris: Universities of France Press), 1968: 367393. 183 Ibid, 375 184 Evans and Phillips, 38. 185 Ibid, 38. 63 workers and grossed $16,500,000 while Muslims owned 7,255 industries which employed 23,000 workers and grossed $1,400,000.186 Without having great influence in the agricultural or industrial sectors of the economy, it was difficult for Muslims to influence policies of the French and Algerian governments in comparison to their European counterparts. The majority of Algerians were not prepared with the knowledge required to allow them to compete with Europeans in the commercial or industrial sectors. By 1890 only ten thousand Muslim children attended primary school, out of a population of three and a half million.187 At the end of World War II this number rose to 1.2 million out of a population of 7 million, but by 1954 only one in five Muslim boys and one in sixteen Muslim girls were attending school.) 188 The war of independence from 1954-1962 eliminated chances for economic growth, as devastation and violence disrupted normal commerce and education. By the end of the war, great numbers of the Europeans that ran and worked the industries (and thousands of French teachers) fled the country. Upward estimates of the numbers of Algerian unemployed reached two million, fifty percent of the population was undernourished, illiteracy was estimated at ninety percent and high birth and death rates meant that the population was becoming more and more youthful.189 Despite this bleak outlook for the future, tremendous change took place following independence. The population increased dramatically over the next decade as greater stability and less violence prevailed in society. The population grew to 13.7 million in 1970, 18.7 million Goutor, 10. Evans and Phillips, 39. 188 Ibid, 39. 189 Goutor, 67. 187 186 64 in 1980 and 26.3 million in 1992.190 The 1976 National Charter nationalized all private schools so that the only type of education was under the auspices of denominationally taught Islamic schools.191 Teachers became part of the public sector and gained employment through the government (which allowed more instructors to enter the work force.) In 1962 only 1,700 Algerian teachers were available, while in 1982 19,000 were present.192 However, the growing population exhausted the capacity of the Algerian education system, so that two-hundred thousand students were leaving school between the ages of six and thirteen and only seven thousand university degrees were awarded in 1980-1981.193 These circumstances put extreme pressure on the society, as those that received education were not gaining knowledge for the best paying or the available jobs in specialized fields (93.4 percent of those in secondary education were divided into general studies while only 7.6 percent were in technical education) but instead were receiving a biased religious curriculum.194 In spite of multiple government attempts to ease the tensions on society through various policies, massive debts were incurred during the 1970s. This severely limited the potential for growth within the economy. In 1988, Algeria¶s debt was equivalent to 46.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 78.7 percent of its exports of goods and services were devoted to paying off the imbalance.195 The dependence on fossil fuels for economic sustenance hurt the country in 1983 and 1986, as oil prices fell. Algeria relied on the exportation of oil for ninety-two percent of its total exports between 1975 and 1982. As less income was returned from oil revenue, it Stora, 167. Ibid, 171. 192 Ibid, 163. 193 Ibid, 165. 194 Ibid, 165. 195 Ibid, 187. 191 190 65 became more difficult for the government to provide public service jobs and subsidies for food, since money needed to be used to service the debt. It should not be difficult at this point to understand why demonstrations and riots broke out in October of 1988 in protest of rising food prices (and general economic chaos); or why violence ensued following the FLN¶s attempt to remain in control of the government despite their loss in the 1991 election cycle. The mass disruption of normal society that took place during the civil war (throughout the 1990s) helped to further build the foundation necessary for AQIM to take advantage of a lack of effective law enforcement and unemployed religiously educated youths, enabling the creation of an economically sustainable organization. The brief economic history discussed should allow for an understanding of how the economic theories already listed are confirmed in the case of Algeria. The economic disparity between the Muslim and European settler population created hardship and marginality both socially and politically in the lives of the majority of the population. In the eyes of the local population, it was apparent that they were less well off than the French or European settlers and lacked recourse for political action (as the wealthiest individuals held the most power over the politics of the country.) This situation confirms both Ted Gurr¶s relative deprivation/structural inequality argument, in addition to the argument of Blomberg et al that persistent negative economic stress without possibilities for change can lead to terrorism. Both Juergensmeyer and Stern¶s arguments are also confirmed as structural unemployment touched a great proportion of the Muslim population and mass migrations to 66 coastal cities gathered many without jobs in Algiers and Oran in particular (See Map-2). The cycle of unemployment was difficult to break for the unemployed since the best paying and most available jobs were taken by the Europeans already working in industries within the city and Muslims were mainly educated through a religiously focused school system that did not prepare its students for technical positions. These conditions predisposed the society to a greater acceptance of radical doctrine and ideology than it may have otherwise tolerated. It is possible to also confirm Kruegar and Laitin¶s argument that terrorism comes from countries which suffer from political oppression, while the targets are countries that are economically more successful. The economic state of Algeria, its capital city Algiers and the Muslims living there, in comparison to the European settlers within these areas and France in general was (and continues to be) poor. Further information from the World Bank Database demonstrates that France was much more successful economically in relation to Algeria. The economic relationship between the more successful European settlers and the less successful Muslim majority was previously discussed. This relationship contributed to grievances between Muslims and European settlers within Algeria and gave many in the country feelings of anger and inferiority, which could have translated into violence over time. Due to a lack of available information on the economic or educational backgrounds of the terrorists of AQIM it is not possible to confirm the arguments of Bueno de Mesquita, Hasan or Krueger and Maleckova. However, based on the historical data already presented, it is possible to infer that none of these theories can be ruled out. It will be feasible to update and amend this as more extensive research becomes available. At this time, the other theories 67 tested are more indicative of the underlying conditions within Algeria which predisposed it to terrorism. With the multiple factors working against the Muslims in Algeria, most still did not initially turn to violence. The elections in 1991 confirmed that the population was not satisfied with the FLN and hoped for a change to a new party (the FIS). For the most part, the people attempted to use democratic and peaceful methods of bringing about the sought after change they believed necessary. Mass violence and killing took place mainly as a result of government repression of the peaceful attempts at regime change (and a perceived inability to bring about an end to the peoples¶ economic hardships through political means.) It is apparent that difficult economic conditions in this case were significant in creating group grievances over time but it is also important to understand that political factors played a significant role as well. Political Factors: The next section discusses theories presented in the introduction which develop an argument for the role of political conditions in predisposing societies to the use of terrorism. It is apparent that these arguments are applicable to the case of Algeria. Political factors in the case of Algeria help illustrate how the creation of perceived oppression within the society turned previously moderate Muslim believers to terrorism and violence. The war of independence led by the FLN can be considered the initial terrorist movement in Algeria. This was a separatist movement in which Algeria hoped to win independence through the use of force against French Algerians, the French Army, the ruling 68 regime within the country and France itself. The history of the war discussed above explains that the conflict was fought in order to gain autonomy over the decision making body of the government of Algeria and independence from French rule. This was done in an attempt to alter existing policies that seemed to produce an inferior economic and political position for most Muslim Algerians. The next few years after independence recorded instability (and initially, tremendous bloodshed) but large-scale popular uprisings were not witnessed again until ³Black October´ in 1988. Even then, terrorist attacks on the government did not occur. Rather, mass demonstrations by the people and eventual rioting took place. The question to ask then, is why terrorism and terrorist groups became prevalent in Algerian society from the early 1990s and continue to have a presence today (when they played almost no role for almost three decades.) Despite a well-defined, albeit partial influence of the cultural and religious factors previously mentioned, it is evident that the political environment of the time was also significant in the onset of the second round of terrorist violence. For comparative purposes, this portion of the section will first briefly recap the theories developed in the previous chapter of this thesis before analyzing them in the Algerian case. All political theories heretofore presented are applicable in Algerian history. The first theory discussed of Ehud Sprinzak explains that terrorism does not happen overnight, but is instead the final step of a process that develops over time, in which a group delegitimizes the established society and regime as a result of longstanding grievances.196 The theory claims that radical factions within the movement turn to violence against a 196 Sprinzak, 59-60. 69 government when there are feelings of frustration and oppression resulting from peaceful demands being ignored or the repression of demonstrations.197 Robert Pape demonstrates that terrorism attacks specific political or territorial goals, such as the withdrawal of military forces from the group¶s homeland or winning other concessions from the government.198 The attacks target civilians and military personnel to cause fear within the community, in order to disrupt proper functioning of the society and to force politicians to acquiesce to the demands brought forth by the terrorist organization.199 The penultimate proposition suggests that the level of political rights, the degree of fractionalization within the government and geographical factors are vital to the advancement of terrorism. Alberto Abadie determines that intermediate levels of political freedom evidenced during times of political transition or instability are the most favorable societal conditions for the promotion of terrorism.200 In addition, Abadie concludes that certain geographic elements (such as deserts, jungles, or mountainous terrain) can allow groups to avoid the rule of law, so that drug production or trafficking and military training can take place unabated.201 The final model proposes that individuals and groups turn to terrorism as a result of relative deprivation and social marginality. Juergensmeyer claims that people who fear that 197 198 Ibid, 60. Robert Pape, The Strategic Logic of Terrorism, The America Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August, 2003): 343-361. 199 Ibid, 346. 200 Alberto Abadie, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism, The American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No.2 (May, 2006): 50-56. 201 Ibid, 70 economic or political status within society is being threatened by another could turn to violence in order to secure their position into the future.202 All of the theories mentioned above are applicable to the Algerian case in some form. In spite of the attempts of the French to provide security, stability and solutions to the problems that arose before and after independence, it is evident that feelings of political discrimination and economic inferiority developed among the majority of the Muslim population in Algeria over an extended period of time. Political discrimination is apparent from the onset of French colonization in Algeria. By 1848, the government of Algeria was not only declared a part of France but was administered by settlers living within the country, rather than the Algerians themselves.203 The Muslim farmer (for example) was disadvantaged, based on the governmentally enforced policy that subsidies were given only to farmers whose ownership was based on French-style titles.204 The government assisted European farmers by giving out loans for irrigation and machinery (in addition to price supports for crops) while organized associations gave political power through Algerian lobbies in Paris.205 This type of assistance was not accessible to Muslim farmers, as bureaucracy and corruption stood in the way. Further, the Sénatus Consulte and Code de l¶indigénat of 1864 declared that all Muslims in Algeria were French subjects, not citizens, so they were deprived of the right to vote and were subject to more invasive police regulations than Europeans and French settlers. This act included the provision which stated that it was necessary to give up their right to be 202 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2003. 203 Goutor, 5. 204 Ibid, 9. 205 Ibid, 9. 71 judged by sharia law in order to become a French citizen. 206 This was obviously not a right that devout Muslims would want to abandon. The French government also authorized the use of vast tracts of land in Algeria by foreign companies in return for roads and community building. A once potentially beneficial policy was extremely detrimental to the people living in the country. Rare enforcement of the community building aspect was experienced, so Muslims were forced to move elsewhere or became tenant farmers of the land they previously owned.207 This policy and others had vast economic consequences for the majority of the population and few had the political representation to affect any type of significant change. The economic factors that led to political and social marginality will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but it is important to note that a feeling of oppression developed as settlers and those chosen to be involved with government work controlled the wealth of the country. During the war for independence, the rights of Muslims were taken away, as the French army enforced martial law through arrests, checkpoints and torture (in an attempt to maintain security.) After the war concluded, the institution of a single-party political system under the leadership of the FLN left little room for political expression. The unforgiving repression of political dissent, in addition to the continuance of policies that hurt the economic prospects of the average Muslim allowed the FLN to remain in power but also led to the civil war and violence of the 1990s. Once independence was won a moderately short lapse was experienced before violence erupted again. This can be ascribed to the fact that the underlying issues behind the push for independence were left unaddressed. 206 207 Ibid, 5. Ibid, 6. 72 The majority of Muslims continued to have difficulty obtaining the necessities of life and unemployment remained in relatively high numbers when compared to percentages of Europeans and French settlers living in the country. The mass demonstrations of 1988 forced the FLN to allow a change in the constitution to allow for a multi-party system and for elections to take place. The overwhelming results of the preliminary elections of 1991 showed that the people were ready for a change from the rule of the FLN (as they chose in favor of the FIS.) The cancellation of the 1992 elections in the face of a new party (the FIS) gaining control over the government (in particular) shows that political rights were not well respected by the ruling military regime. As the FLN cancelled the elections and outlawed the FIS, the Muslim population began to equate the ruling party with an oppressive regime like that witnessed under French colonialism and so chose to rebel once again. The GIA took control of the opposition movement in the civil war and attacked civilians, buildings, the government, the military and infrastructure with the goal of forcing enough damage and fear to cause change. The GIA was superseded by GSPC in 1998 as government crack downs limited the previous group¶s effectiveness toward the end of the decade. The GSPC (and later AQIM) experienced success from this point and continues to see it today, as it takes advantage of geographical impediments to the area¶s law enforcement. The ³European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report´ produced by Europol explains that in 2009 AQIM was responsible for attacks on government buildings and aid workers in Mauritania and abductions throughout the Sahel region (including Mali and 73 Niger).208 The group has used kidnappings and other illegal activities to fund their operations. AQIM is thought to have received over $70 million in ransom since 2006 but this is a small number in comparison to its other ventures.209 The porous nature and lack of policing of the borders across the Sahel region not only allow the group to attack and retreat to safety quickly but also provide smuggling opportunities as cigarettes, drugs and arms are transferred easily between countries in the area.210 To give an idea of the extent of the problem, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) believes that between fifty and sixty tons of cocaine travel from South America to Europe through this region each year.211 Returning to the example provided earlier (of the Moroccan authorities who confiscated 600 kilograms of cocaine (worth $60 million) on its way to Europe from Algeria and Mauritania), it is apparent that AQIM can acquire an enormous income if it is truly involved with sixty tons. The UNODC estimates that $1.8 billion worth of cocaine transits through West Africa.212 Algeria is also considered to be a transit point for cannabis from Morocco, (as well as opium and other depressants) as over seventy percent of cannabis consumed in Europe comes from this area.213 Based on this information and the history of politics within Algeria, it is not difficult to see the applicability of Abadie, Juergensmeyer, Pape and Sprinzak¶s arguments. Given clear and convincing examples exhibited over time, it is not possible to rule out any of these theories in Algeria¶s case. The lack of effective law enforcement in the mountain and Europol, TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, p. 26-27. Goita, 4. 210 Hansen, 4. 211 Dario Cristiani, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Africa-to-Europe Narco-Trafficking Connection, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 43 (November 2010): 5-6. 212 Stephen Ellis, West Africa s International Drug Trade, African Affairs, 108/431 (2009): 171-196. 213 Anneli Botha, African Commitments to Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, ISS Paper 131, (December 2006): 14-16. 209 208 74 desert areas throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions provides a safe haven for AQIM to conduct drug trafficking, kidnappings and training unabated, which allows for the continuation of the organization. Attacks against the government and civilians took place with the intent of affecting political changes; as the oppressive ruling regime was ³delegitimized´ in the eyes of the majority of the people (due to feelings of discrimination and injustice.) Moreover, violence was also experienced, as people encountered relative deprivation and social marginality over long periods of time; as the government could not provide and support policies to ameliorate the hardships encountered economically within the society. The effect of relative economic disparities between the Muslim, European and French settler populations and overall deprivation cannot be ignored as important conditions underlying the conduciveness within Algeria toward terrorism and violence. In order to understand the full extent of how previous groups originated and how AQIM continues its presence today, it is necessary to consider the role of economic factors. Even with the economic and political conditions within a society (which potentially are contributing to the development of terrorism) not all who face these conditions turn to violent methods for change. To understand why this may be the case, it is necessary to consider the psychological theories that supplement those of a structurally based argument. The last section will briefly discuss these theories and whether they can be applied to the development and continuation of AQIM. 75 Psychological Factors: The theories mentioned in the last chapter of this thesis focus on two aspects of the potential explanations for psychological factors contributing to terrorism and are applicable in the case of Algeria. The first theory explains terrorist activity as a result of group dynamics. Abrahms and Crenshaw claim that the intimate relationships that develop in times of hardship within a group can be important in drawing individuals toward terrorist organizations that provide social solidarity.214 Those with feelings of loneliness, rejection, or exclusion from the benefits of society therefore join terrorist organizations to be a part of a group and may not fully take into account or initially internalize its political agenda.215 The alternative theory of rational choice is proposed by Hoffman and Pape. The authors claim that terrorism is a logical choice for some individuals and terrorist groups based on the alternatives they face in their society.216 This theory explains that individuals turn to criminal and terrorist activity due to the inability to find meaningful and profitable employment in the conventional market. Terrorist groups then employ violent methods because they believe it is the most effective way to achieve their goals given their relative 214 Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring, 2008): 78-105. 215 Abrahms, 94-96 216 Bruce Hoffman, The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology, Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2002 and Pape, 344-347. 76 unequal capabilities in respect to large military forces, available resources and potential to influence their target audience.217 Both group dynamic and rational choice theories are applicable in the case of AQIM. Group solidarity among the mujahedeen returning from the war in Afghanistan would be extremely high, as they fought alongside one another. These returnees both directly and indirectly helped to begin the violence of the 1990s. Many of the current militants of AQIM originally joined the terrorist movement of the GIA in reaction to the political repression of the FLN following the 1991 elections and the poor economic conditions that were prevalent throughout the country. Among the millions of unemployed, it is more than possible that many felt excluded from the economic and political aspects of society. Additionally, AQIM (over the past six years) has moved insurgents through North Africa to fight in Iraq. It is estimated that between nine and twenty-five percent of foreign fighters in Iraq originate from Northern Africa.218 Further solidarity and networking within insurgency groups can allow militants to feel part of a cause greater than that of the individual and validate the radical doctrine they have been taught. When the potential economic gains resulting from a reliable and substantial income for members of AQIM is compared to unemployment (or meaningless jobs with low wages) it seems that many are making a rational choice to join the group. It can also be said that it is a rational choice for those aiding AQIM throughout the Sahel and Sahara regions, since they receive bribes, an income, protection and work in return for their assistance and silence in the face of 217 218 Hoffman, 64. Hansen, 4. 77 government inquisitions.219 It is not prudent therefore to rule out psychological factors in the case of AQIM, as each theory can be verified in this instance as well. Conclusion: Through this discussion of Algerian history (since the beginning of France¶s colonialism in 1830) it is apparent that multiple conditions developed within the society that predisposed the area to terrorism. In this case it was impossible to rule out any of the structural or psychological theories discussed. It is therefore important to remember that each country develops different conditions based on its own cultural, economic, political and psychological factors over time. Group grievances stemming from any of the structural factors mentioned have the potential to contribute to terrorism, as fanatical doctrine and ideology are able to find more receptive audiences in times of persistent hardship. This is especially the case when these underlying conditions combine with one or more psychological conditions. From this case, it is apparent that terrorism is more likely, as multiple societal grievances build between and within the categories of factors mentioned above over time. The last chapter of this thesis will expand on the testing of the theories of underlying conditions which predispose societies to terrorism with a case study on the Chechen rebellion. 219 Goita, 3. 78 THESIS CH. 3, CASE STUDY: WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS WITHIN CHECHNYA WHICH PREDISPOSED THE REGION TO TERRORISM? Introduction: This chapter will attempt to examine the underlying conditions which predisposed the region to the initiation of terrorist movements within the area of the North Caucus designated as Chechnya. The first two chapters of this thesis have analyzed the underlying conditions within Algeria and Northern Ireland which predisposed these regions to the use of terrorism. The previous chapters tested theories based on arguments derived from the five working groups devoted to understanding the underlying conditions of terrorism at the March 2005, Madrid Summit. These groups included the top experts from around the world who are knowledgeable on the categories of terrorism resulting from cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious factors. The present case study will also use this methodology to test the arguments that have been developed by theorists within these categories in order to help bring further understanding to the issue of terrorism. This chapter commences with a section focused on a brief history of the Chechen region and additional background of its conflict with Russia. An analysis of the conflict within Chechnya follows the initial sections. The analysis portion of the chapter refers to the theories regarding the underlying conditions of terrorism that were outlined in the introduction and have been tested in the previous two chapters. These theories are evaluated based on their applicability and relevance to the terrorism experienced in Chechnya. Based on the previous two case studies, it should be apparent that it is impossible to designate only one factor as completely explanatory of the underlying conditions which 79 predispose some societies to the use of terrorism. This paper will test the hypothesis that claims that multiple combinations of underlying conditions within society blend together to predispose societies to the use of terrorism. In spite of the fact that these combinations of factors will vary in importance from case to case, the paper tests whether all of the potential conditions mentioned at the Madrid Summit are confirmed in the case of Chechnya. A history of Chechnya will help lay the foundations for an understanding of the conditions that predisposed the Chechen society to the use of terrorism to obtain their goals of secession from Russia throughout the 1990s until the present. At first glance, many may believe that the beginnings of the violence began with the problems associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union brought about the opportunity for the creation of newly independent nations throughout its former borders and within the Caucus region. Declarations of independence were issued in the early 1990s from multiple newly formed nations which were all eventually acknowledged by the world governments of the UN, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.220 The Chechen Republic also declared its independence at this time but was unrecognized by the UN and continued to be considered as a territory within the Russian state. Looking further into the history of the Republic, it is possible that the roots of the violence do not only stem from these more recent developments. Instead the violence perpetrated by the Chechen people appears to be both a reaction to the situation mentioned above and a manifestation of additional prior circumstances which stretch throughout the territory¶s past, over the last three centuries. The next sections will provide a descriptive 220 http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml 80 timeline of Chechnya¶s history, bridging a period beginning with its first encounters with colonialism of the Tsars of the Russian Empire in the 18th century to the present day. 18th Century: Russian Territorial Expansion and North Caucus Rebellion This section will provide a brief reflection on the relevance of the 18th century to the understanding of potential factors behind the use of terrorism and violence by the Chechen people against Russia today. The initial colonization of the Caucasus began with Peter the Great¶s campaign into the region in 1722, which resulted in the Treaty of St. Petersburg and Persia ceding Dagestan (located on Chechnya¶s eastern border) to the Russian Empire.221 Further expansion throughout the area was halted initially by resistance from locals of the village of Enderi in eastern Chechnya and finally by the death of Peter in 1725.222 Peter¶s stalled goals for expansion were resumed during the reign of Catherine the Great, who ruled from 1762-1796. Catherine¶s construction of a fort at Mozdok in North Ossetia in 1762 resulted in conflicts between Russia and the Kabardintsy (1765-1779) and the Ottoman Empire (1768-74).223 Russia¶s success in these conflicts allowed it to absorb the Crimea into its territory and push its boundaries to the edge of the Chechen-Ingushetia territories. The Russian Empire¶s encroachment into the Caucasus sparked a resistance movement from 1785 to 1791 within the local populations of Chechnya, Dagestan and the Kumyk plateau, Kabardino-Balkaria and the Kuban. This progression is important for the purposes of this case study because it marks the first widespread opposition movement to the 221 John Dunlop. Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998. 222 Ibid, 7. 223 Ibid, 8. 81 Russian army, originating out of the North Caucus region. In addition, its leader is still considered a prominent idol in the minds of resistance leaders today. Mansur Ushurma (Sheikh Mansur) originated from the Muslim village of Aldi in Chechnya and was the leader of this resistance movement from 1785-1791.224 Mansur preached a strict adherence to purified Islam and Islamic law (sharia) and called for a holy war against corrupt Muslims and those attempting to impose Russian Orthodoxy in the area.225 Mansur¶s fame is derived from his work to solidify Islam in the Caucus and for his victory on the banks of the Sunzha River near his hometown of Aldi. A Russian force successfully burned the evacuated village of Aldi in 1785 but was later trapped upon its return at the Sunzha by Mansur, leading to six-hundred deaths and two-hundred captured Russian soldiers.226 However, after several defeats during the Russo-Turkish War (17871791) the movement was suppressed, as Mansour was captured and jailed until his death in 1794.227 The loss resulted in the addition of the land considered to be Georgia today to the Russian Empire¶s territory which meant that Chechnya, Dagestan and the rest of the Caucasus were now surrounded. The people of the region saw their cultures, lands, religions and livelihoods threatened by the impending movement of colonization. The initial stages of violence may have been halted momentarily with the Russian military victories mentioned above. However, this lull was short lived, as others attempted to fill the void left by the death of Mansour. The initial rebellions witnessed during this time period demonstrate the beginnings of a long and continuing tradition of violence in the Caucasus and in Chechnya Ibid, 9. Vicken Cheterian. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia s Troubled Frontier. (London: Hurst Publishers Ltd.), 2008. 226 Dunlop, 11. 227 Ibid, 12-13. 225 224 82 today. The 19th century was marked by further Russian expansion into these territories, the subsequent series of three separate deportations of the people of Chechen and Dagestan and the Caucasian War (1817-1864). 19th Century: Further Conquest of Chechnya, Deportations, Rebellion and Caucasian War The construction of forts and further expansion of Russian forces into the Caucus region resulted in the continuation of smaller rebellions (following Sheikh Mansour¶s death in 1794) until the territories turned toward a full scale opposition in 1817, beginning the Caucasian War (1817-1864).228 The Chechens and other fighters from the Caucasus persisted in conflict through the 1830s under the leadership of Imam Shamil until his capture in 1859 and the subsequent absorption of Chechnya into the Russian Empire.229 The years immediately following the completion of the war brought about a massive deportation and immigration of North Caucasian Muslims, particularly Chechens. In 1865 it is estimated that 39,000 Chechens (or one-fifth of the territory¶s population at the time) were moved to the Ottoman Empire.230 For comparative purposes, , between 1856 and 1864 it is estimated that approximately 600,000 Muslims from the entirety of the Caucasus were moved to the Ottoman Empire with 81,360 of those coming from Chechnya alone in 1860 and 22,500 in 1865.231 The total numbers of migrating Chechens is estimated to be over 100,000 during this time period. Furthermore, the mortality rate of those involved 228 Philip Hanson and Michael Bradshaw. The Territories of the Russian Federation. (London: Europa Publications Limited), 1999. 229 Christopher Hewitt and Tom Cheetham. Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements. (Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, Inc.), 2000. 230 Christopher Panico. Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia s War in Chechnya . Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism: Conflict Studies, Vol.281 (July, 1995):1-25. 231 Dunlop, 29-30. 83 in the Caucus migrations was over thirty-three percent due to exhaustion, disease and malnutrition throughout the journey.232 The deportations displaced thousands of people and continued to foster a negative relationship between the Chechen people and the Russian state. The relationship deteriorated further over the next one-hundred years as small scale conflicts persisted and deportations of an even greater magnitude took place. 20th Century (Prior to Dissolution of the Soviet Union): Creation of Chechen Autonomous Oblast, Stalin s WWII Allegations, Exile and Mass Deportations The Chechen territory became an autonomous oblast of the Soviet Union in 1920 following the harsh suppression of additional Chechen revolts during the Russian Civil War (1918-1920).233 Later, Chechnya and the bordering oblast of Ingushetia were joined to establish an ³autonomous republic´ within the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (known as an ASSR).234 The arrangement was of importance at the time because it allowed the Soviet Union to administer the territories directly through its Executive Committee of the North Caucasian which left little authority or decision making power to the local populations of Chechens or Ingushetians.235 Nevertheless, twenty years later during the Soviet mobilizations of the Second World War (from 1942-1943), a relatively large group of 17,413 Chechens voluntarily enlisted in the Red Army to support the Soviet Union against the Axis Powers, while a small group of 100 or less supported the Nazi cause.236 In spite of the support for the Red Army from a 232 Ibid, 30. Hewitt and Cheetham, 63. 234 Ibid, 63. 235 Panico, 3. 236 Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus. (Surrey: Curzon Press), 2001. 233 84 majority of the people from the region, Joseph Stalin accused the Chechens and Ingush of collaboration with the German army and instituted a plan for deportation and exile on Red Army day in February of 1944.237 Stalin dissolved the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and chose to deport over 600,000 people within the North Caucus from their homes to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia.238 Whether the exile directly or indirectly targeted Chechens specifically is debated within Russian historical accounts. However, the number of Chechens affected disproportionately exceeds that of any other group. Of the 600,000 total number deported, 400,000 were of Chechen origin.239 The deportation of these particular ethnic groups from the Caucasus affected hundreds of thousands from around the region and resulted in genocide of over 100,000 deaths.240 In 1957 Nikita Khrushchev reestablished the ASSR and allowed the Chechen people to return to their homes and land.241 The return to the Chechen territory was accompanied by a population boom between 1959 and 1979 in which the number of Chechens doubled.242 However, the Chechens returned to destroyed mosques, territory that was claimed by Dagestanis in their absence and Russian occupants who controlled the petroleum industry.243 Those who returned also faced educational and job discrimination up through the collapse of the Soviet Union.244 Between 1979 and 1989 for example, fewer than five percent of the Ibid, 198. James Hughes. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 2007. 239 Ibid, 9-10. 240 Ibid, 9-10. 241 Hewitt and Cheetham, 63. 242 Cornell, 202. 243 Hanson and Bradshaw, 51. 244 Panico, 4. 238 237 85 population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR had higher education and over fifteen percent of the Chechens had no educational training.245 The educational and discriminatory circumstances just mentioned limited the Chechen¶s ability to engage in skilled trades, which forced many into unemployment or becoming seasonal agricultural laborers in Russia and Central Asia.246 These poor conditions, combined with the prior history of deportation and violence toward the Chechen people, created an atmosphere conducive to an oppositional political movement. By the beginning of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chechens initiated a move toward sovereignty of their territory through a conglomeration of newly formed unregistered political parties at the first National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCP) in November of 1990.247 At its second meeting a year later, the NCCP officially declared both its intentions to separate from Russia and the RSFSR and elected Djokhar Dudayev as its president.248 Dudayev proceeded to declare independence from Russia and declared the local Supreme Soviet dissolved. This was not recognized by Boris Yeltsin or the Russian government.249 Instead, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic and sent troops to an airport east of Chechnya¶s capital, Grozny.250 These troops were subsequently recalled and the Russian government issued a treaty redefining the status of Chechnya within the state. However, this treaty was rejected.251 Chechnya experienced de facto independence from 1992-1994 as it declined its invitation to participate in the Russian general elections and Cornell, 202. Panico, 4. 247 Chretian, 228. 248 Ibid, 229. 249 Ibid, 230. 250 Panico, 7 251 Hewitt and Cheetham, 64. 246 245 86 rejected the new Russian federal Constitution.252 From 1992 forward the Chechen Republic experienced further economic and political turmoil, culminating in civil war, an unsuccessful Russian backed coup d¶état and eventual invasion in 1994.253 The next section will briefly discuss the importance of the ensuing war that took place between 1994 and 1996 between Russia and the Chechen Republic. The next section will also briefly discuss the second Russian invasion in 1999 and the violence that continued throughout the first portion of the 21st century and persists today. 1994-Present: First and Second Russian Invasions of Chechnya, High Civilian Casualties, Mass Destruction and Use of Terrorism The first war in Chechnya from 1994-1996 resulted in the deaths of 2,837 soldiers of the Russian Defense Ministry Forces Group and the wounding of 13,270, with 432 prisoners also taken.254 The results of individual battles, tactical decisions, troop movements and other military procedures are important in their own right, but not necessary for the purposes of this paper. Instead, this section touches on the significance of the results of the war and the Chechen decision to use terrorism outside its own territory. The war was marked by Russian use of overwhelming, destructive force through heavy artillery strikes against civilian populations within cities and villages of Chechnya. The effects of bombing were devastating to buildings, civilians and their homes, infrastructure and personal property. A committee of twenty-two nations (the International Parliamentary Hanson and Bradshaw, 51. Hewitt and Cheetham, 64. 254 Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press), 1999, 303. 253 252 87 Commission) reported that 62,400 houses and 59,360 apartments were destroyed, with the total cost of damages within Chechnya amounting to $104 billion.255 It is important to note that during the 1994-1996 war Chechens used 250 fighters to engage in two terrorist attacks outside of Chechen territory. These attacks took place outside of normal military actions taken against Russia within the Republic and targeted innocent civilians. The first took place in Budionovsk in the Russian province of Stavropol from June 13-21, 1995 and the second took place in Kizliar and Pervomaiskoje from January 9-18, 1996.256 Both attacks involved the taking of hostages, deaths of civilians living in the area and targeted hospitals.257 However, the second attack proved to be the more extensive of the two. The Chechen fighters attacked an airport and railroad station before they blockaded two buildings and took control of the hospital. In doing so, estimates claim that the fighters took between 2,000 to 3,000 hostages and caused the injury or death of about 800 Russian soldiers.258 The destruction of the village of Pervomaiskoje by Russian artillery and mortar attacks is also an important result of the attack. This occurrence illustrates similar patterns to later outbreaks of this type of terrorism in which hostages were taken and the Russian response resulted in civilian deaths and destruction. The peace settlement that was eventually agreed upon assured Russian economic assistance to remedy the damaged infrastructure. However, a lack of strong law enforcement capabilities, combined with the economic problems associated with the ³black market´ that Ibid, 303-304. Ibid, 235. 257 Ibid, 235. 258 Ibid, 246. 256 255 88 developed in the region, limited the effectiveness of the little aid that actually was provided. Chechnya lost most of its state institutions, as lawlessness and organized kidnapping became prevalent from 1996-1999.259 In 1998 internal opposition groups within Chechnya attempted to set up an Islamic court system (the Supreme Sharia Court) to ensure laws were consistent with Islam and take away power from the Republic¶s parliament.260 The Chechen president at the time, Aslan Maskhadov, attempted to preempt the opposition by establishing Sharia law himself and removed those who disagreed from positions of authority.261 Maskhadov also forbid illegally formed foreign groups that were armed or spread religious ideologies (which turned these groups against him.) This sparked an invasion of Dagestan and bomb attacks in Moscow by militant Islamic soldiers from these banned groups in 1999.262 Russia responded with heavy air strikes, artillery before its invasion of 100,000 soldiers into affected cities and later Chechnya itself (three times as many soldiers than the first war).263 Before a year passed, the Russian army had taken back all larger settlements and forced the rebels into mountainous areas. From 2000 until the present day, guerilla warfare and terrorist attacks have continued, with similar resulting violence. The most significant terrorist attacks occurred in 2000, 2002 and 2004 when a woman conducted a suicide Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus. (New York: New York University Press), 2007. 260 Ibid, 87. 261 Ibid, 87. 262 Ibid,92. 263 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace (London: Frank Cass Publishers), 2001. 259 89 bombing and both a Moscow theater and secondary school in Beslan were controlled by Chechen gunmen, resulting in hostage deaths.264 The casualties for the second war are difficult to verify, due to Russian censorship of information. However, estimates claim that between 1999-2002, about 4,500 soldiers of Russia, 3,000 of Chechnya and 13,000 civilians died as a result of the violence.265 Even though the total number of deaths is less than the number from the first war, the totals of displaced persons in this war are much higher. Estimates claim that between September 1999 and November 1999, the number of displaced individuals rose from 56,000 to 239,000 (before gradually decreasing to 170,000 by June 2000 and 150,000 in August of 2001.)266 The negative implications for the affected societies are apparent in all aspects of life within the Republic. The every-day functioning of the economy, government and social institutions (such as law and order) can be severely threatened in this type of environment. This however is not the only potential condition that could predispose the Chechen society to the use of violence. The next section of this paper will analyze the history of Chechnya to determine whether the five categories of underlying conditions of terrorism created at the Madrid Summit in 2005 can be confirmed in this case. Zurcher, 94-97. Ibid, 100. 266 Ibid,101. 265 264 90 Analysis Cultural and Religious Factors: A brief recap of cultural conditions that can predispose societies to the use of terrorism follows. As explained previously, multiple theorists attempt to attribute cultural factors such as a common ethnicity or religion to terrorism. One aspect of the argument explains that terrorism can be viewed as a last resort for groups after its members¶ ethnicity or religion have been faced with a history of inequality, oppression, unfair treatment, lack of freedom, threats toward their group or violence.267 The shared sense of injustice among the members of the certain ethnic or religious group creates feelings of anger and hostility toward those who are seen as the progenitor of oppression. There are multiple instances of cultural factors in Chechnya to support the confirmation of this type of theory. The Chechen society holds many ³shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths, and traditions´ which fuel the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to the development of fanaticism. For example, banditry and guerrilla warfare have deep roots in the traditions of Chechen society as a result of the persistent confrontations with invading Russian forces over the course of three-hundred years.268 John Russell explains that theorists believe that banditry in particular is a social tradition in which Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 268 John Russell, Chechnya- Russia s War on Terror . (London: Routledge), 2007. 267 91 resistance to an occupying force and authority itself is valued. A type of ³freedom cult´ in Chechen society developed over time as the people began to identify themselves with resistance to the impositions of ³alien rule´.269 Russell also points out that the Chechen collective µfolk¶ memory of ³victories, tragedies, heroes and villains´ has held a strong presence historically throughout its long struggle and attempts to separate from Russia. The author points out other cultural aspects as well: One being the traditional rules (adat) of the North Caucasus that many live by. The adat includes a strict honor code under which ancestral history and blood ties are important. This relationship is exemplified in the militarized clans called teips, which are organized by blood and territorial lines and constitute the foundation of criminal gangs and resistance.270 Robert Ware reiterates that Chechen society is fragmented (due to competition between the leaders of over 150 teips) and susceptible to radicalism as these leaders attempt to justify their goals through ideological terms that ³transcend social cleavages´. The leaders use ³extreme rhetoric´ and acts of violence to rally support behind them, which destabilizes the society and limits the potential for government to claim authority.271 Ware indicates that the leaders use Islamic or nationalist rhetoric and the Chechen warrior mythology to invoke retributive action and violence against state authority and the other teips.272 Islamic radicalism also can be considered a cultural condition that has undergirded the predisposition for violence in the most modern portions of the conflict. Chechnya experienced an extensive importation of militant Wahhabi funding and ideology during the Ibid, 13-18 Ibid, 18. 271 Robert Ware (2005). A Multitude of Evils: Mythology and Political Failure in Chechnya . In: Richard Sakwa, (ed). Chechnya: From Past to Future, (London: Anthem Press), p. 80-131. 272 Ibid, 89. 270 269 92 period of time between the end of the first war in 1996 and the beginning of the second in 1999.273 A process which some now identify as ³Chechenization´ took place in Chechnya in the mid-1990s as the society transformed from a mostly Muslim society with a traditional, pre-Islamic structure to one of radical Jihadist features that have not historically been present.274 Bodasnky also claims that the ideology of the national separatist movement from the first war was taken over by Jihadist radicals and turned the conflict into a ³regional anti-Russian terrorist jihad at the expense of the Chechens¶ own self-interest.´275 This statement is embodied in the Jihadist¶s intentional destruction of the area¶s own socioeconomic infrastructure and the exportation of Chechen fighters to other areas influenced by outside forces (such as Afghanistan and Iraq) for use in the ³global jihad´ against the West.276 By 1999 Maskhadov had placed Chechnya under Sharia law, due to pressure from hundreds of Arab gunmen with al-Qaeda connections near Urus-Martan and their training camp in Serzhen-Yurt financed and trained militant oppositional forces.277 Based on these accounts, cultural forces in Chechnya create conditions conducive to the predisposition of the society to terrorism. Organizational societal structures, historical folk legends and myths and radical ideology and religious doctrine all contribute to the use of terrorism in this case. However, it is possible that these conditions would not predispose the society to the use of terrorism if both economic and political conditions were in an improved state. Thus, in this case, cultural conditions can be considered to have a multiplying effect Khapta Akhmedova and Anne Speckhard (2006). A Multi-Causal Analysis of the Genesis of Suicide Terrorism: The Chechen Case . In: Jeff Victoroff, (ed). Chechnya: From Past to Future, (Fairfax: IOS Press), p. 324-354. 274 Yossef Bodansky, Chechn Jihad. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers), 2007. 275 Ibid, 3. 276 Ibid, 4. 277 Ware, 97. 273 93 when added to others, but may not be entirely explanatory without the addition of other explanatory factors. The next section will discuss economic conditions in light of the Chechen case. Economic Factors: Chechnya was always a poor region within the Soviet Union, as it was historically supported by large Russian subsidies and transfer payments. Prior to the wars of the 1990s, the economy for most of Chechnya was predominantly agricultural, with a reliance on grain production. In its capital city Grozny however, manufacturing of machinery and the production of petroleum were relied upon. Chechnya had the second most productive oil fields in the Soviet Union before World War II and throughout the 1980s 7.5 million tons of oil were extracted per year.278 By 1993 this amount fell to only 2.6 million tons while Grozny¶s oil refinery decreased its production from 17 million tons in 1991 to 1.2 million tons in 1993.279 This income and revenue from oil production and export was not distributed to the majority of the population, as Russians held most positions in this field. Economic problems were apparent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as Chechnya¶s agriculture production fell by forty-six percent in 1992 while its industrial output fell by thirty percent in 1992 and by sixty-one percent in 1993.280 The wars of the 1990s destroyed what little Chechnya had in both industrial and agricultural economic infrastructure. After the first war, eighty percent of Chechen industry had been destroyed.281 Zurcher, 72. Ibid, 72. 280 Cornell, 212. 281 Knezys and Sedlickas,303 279 278 94 This resulted in negative consequence for the people, as close to four-fifths of Chechnya¶s population was unemployed by 1998.282 The combination of lawlessness (with an inability to carry on agricultural and industrial activity) created an environment conducive to corruption and a black market economy. Russell explains that clientelism and corruption in Chechnya and Russia are apparent in the warlords of the teips and throughout all levels of society.283 Ware explains that much of the international aid and federal support from Russia is ³mishandled´ by government officials. Ware refers to a report to the Russian Federation Council indicating that of the $2.3 billion allocated for Chechnya¶s reconstruction, only $344 million reached Chechnya and of the 88,000 applicants for compensation of destroyed housing, only 8,000 had been accommodated.284 Another problem stems from the illegal extraction of oil by criminal groups and even private households. In 1998 for example, at least 400,000 tons of oil out of 843,000 tons produced was extracted illegally in Chechnya.285 Additionally, arms dealing and kidnappings for ransom constituted other methods of income for Chechens in the ³shadow economy´. The Russian Ministry of the Interior claims that between 1992 and 2000 there were 1,815 kidnappings in the North Caucasus.286 These devastating conditions help to explain and confirm the economic theories underlying the predisposition to terrorism mentioned. Juergensmeyer¶s argument that economic conditions can concentrate frustrated individuals into certain areas and create pockets for recruitment is apparent in this case. With unemployment rates of up to eighty percent in 1998 and few jobs available in Chechnya, many fell to the temptations of engaging 282 Hanson and Bradshaw, 53. Russell, 19. 284 Ware, 111. 285 Zurcher, 104. 286 Ibid,105. 283 95 in criminal activity and later joined groups who used terrorist violence. The poor economy created conditions conducive to extreme nationalistic and religious ideology that was easily spread among the unemployed concentrated in the few major cities in the Republic. Ted Gurr¶s relative deprivation and structural inequality argument is applicable also, as Russians living within Chechnya had more access to industrial positions and well-paying jobs, while Chechens were discriminated against prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Both during and following the wars of the 1990s, the Russians left the region; but the memories of the negative and one-sided economic relationship remained. Along similar lines, confirmation of Kruegar and Latin¶s argument that terrorism comes from countries which suffer from political oppression, while the targets are countries that are economically more successful is possible as well, given Chechnya¶s historical fact pattern in relation to Russia. Russian invasions and occupation of Chechnya for a period of over three hundred years created feelings of oppression as their economy and politics were controlled by what Chechens perceive to be an outside force. Russian mass deportations of Chechens in the 1940s and army violence against civilians during war time also added to negative feelings of oppression. Also confirmed from this relationship is the argument of Blomberg et al, which explains that groups use terrorism when there is a persistent negative economic status that cannot change through political or institutional methods.287 A study of suicide terrorism in Chechnya conducted by Akmedova and Speckhard from 2003 to 2005 confirms the arguments of Bueno de Mesquite, Hassan, and Kruegar and Maleckova. The data acquired revealed that all suicide terrorists in the sample of thirty-four 287 Brock Blomberg et al, An Economic Model of Terrorism. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2004. 96 had at least a high school education. The majority of the suicide terrorists had a high school education (at 67.6 percent of the sample) while 23.5 percent had college or university degrees.288 In addition, 58.8 percent were deemed to be a part of a ³middle´ socioeconomic status, 29.4 percent of ³good´ socioeconomic status and 5.9 percent to be of ³poor´ or ³high´ status.289 This demonstrates that the suicide terrorists had a similar level of education as the general Chechen society and were not impoverished relative to the rest of their community. Screening of applicants for use in these types of missions and a ³Robin Hood´ effect could come into play based on these results. The findings mirror those of Kruegar and Maleckova so it is not surprising that the four theorists would agree on these conclusions. Stern¶s argument is validated by further data from this study. Stern¶s theory regarding terrorism and the use of violence as a result of the frustrations of persistent unemployment among educated groups also applies. Akhmedova and Speckhard found that 88.2 percent (30 of the Chechen suicide terrorists in the study) were unemployed, while the other four owned their own business.290 Based on the data mentioned above, it is apparent that these terrorists were educated but unemployed (which supports a claim that economic conditions can create tensions and an environment conducive to terrorism.) This data could potentially be extrapolated to the rest of the criminal and terrorist community within Chechnya which did not use suicide terrorist tactics (but did use violence.) The economic considerations of those involved in this recent study were at least in part due to the destruction and violence of the wars within the country. A lack of proper law enforcement and a government with overarching authority contributed to the development of 288 Akhmedova and Speckhard, 336. Ibid, 336. 290 Ibid, 336. 289 97 this situation as well. The next section will focus on these types of factors in order to evaluate and understand the theories of political conditions in explaining the predisposition of societies to terrorism. Political Factors: Based on the historical accounts above, all theories in this section can be confirmed in this case. According to Ehud Sprinzak, ³terrorism implies a crisis of legitimacy´ and ³since terrorism never emerges overnight, the crisis of legitimacy unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society and the regime.´ 291 The deportations of Chechens in 1944, the destruction of cities and violence against civilians all combined to create the type of situation described by Spinzak between Chechnya and Russia. As mentioned before, Chechen culture in general now rarely sees even Chechen government authorities as legitimate today. Pape¶s argument on the use of suicide terrorism against democracies to achieve territorial goals is directly relevant to the case of Chechnya. The study of Chechen suicide terrorism of Akhmedova and Speckhard concluded that the most indicative trait needed to explain its use was living under conditions of national conflict or occupation.292 Repressive actions by the Russian army were experienced by the family members of all thirty four of the suicide terrorists in the study of Chechnya. Of the family members of these thirty-four 58.8 percent experienced interrogations, 26.5 percent had fled their homes and 14.7 percent had 291 Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3 (Spring/Summer 2005), 1: 50-68. 292 Akhmedova and Speckhard, 346. 98 their homes destroyed.293 It is evident from this data and the historical accounts already mentioned that the results of the many negative conditions fueled the use of terrorism against what was perceived to be a form of occupation of the Russians over the Chechens. Also confirmed is Albadie¶s argument which concludes that the level of political rights, the amount of fractionalization and geography can contribute to the development of terrorism. For Albadie and Kruegar, the inability of the state to enforce the law in certain areas is instrumental in the creation and sustainability of certain terrorist movements. The eradication of institutions and law enforcement in Chechnya after the first war of the 1990s created conditions conducive to terrorism in most major cities and towns. History also shows that the mountainous regions of the country have consistently been a difficult area for the Russian army and state authorities to regulate, particularly in times of war. These difficult to access areas became ideal locations for militants to hide, as bases for training and stores of ammunition are more easily concealed than those of the low-land. The theories do not entirely encapsulate the range of political factors that could have predisposed Chechnya to the use of terrorism. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had both economic and political repercussions for the region that the other countries mentioned in this thesis would not have dealt with. Internal opposition to the established Chechen governments in the 1990s also adds complications that were lacking in the more unified movements in Algeria and Northern Ireland. The most salient points from the Chechen case are that the goal of independence and sovereignty drove the first civil war from 1994-1996 and a lack of law enforcement and government authority from 1997 onward eroded institutions and capacity for overall economic success. 293 Ibid, 345. 99 Psychological Factors: The last section of this chapter discusses theories regarding psychology and group dynamics. As was formerly indicated, there are few theorists that disregard psychological factors (or the power of individual emotions, relationships, history and societal inclusion in contributing to terrorism) completely. This section confirms the role of group dynamics and rational choice theories in relation to the terrorism of Chechnya. To reiterate, Abrahms and Crenshaw argue that engaging in terrorism is a group activity in which interactions involving intimate relationships among a small number of people take place and that this can be an important factor in determining terrorist behavior.294 According to this approach, individuals participate in terrorist organizations for the social solidarity they can obtain to combat feelings of alienation, rather than the political agenda the group adheres to. The study of Akhmedova and Speckhard, while limited to suicide terrorists, has the potential to verify this argument in the case of Chechnya. According to the data collected, social alienation and isolation occurred in 94.1 percent of terrorists involved in their sample.295 This seems extremely relevant when comparing other personality disorders measured in the study. The next closest disorder was the depression experienced by 61.8 percent of the sample population, suspiciousness by 29.4 percent, aggression and fanaticism by 26.5 percent, internal conflicts by 20.6 percent and guilt by 8.8 percent. In the Chechen Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, 4 (July, 1981): 379-399, and Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, International Security, Vol.32, No.4 (Spring 2008): 78-105. 295 Akhmedova and Speckhard, 339. 294 100 case it is evident that alienation plays a significant role in suicide terrorism and it is certainly plausible that the larger group of those involved in terrorism feel similarly. Hoffman and Pape argue that acts of terrorism are rational decisions made by groups and individuals in order to gain supporters, coerce opponents, or earn employment outside the options available within the normal market. A rational choice argument stating that terrorists plan and execute acts of violence (while taking into account their goals, available resources, capabilities and the ³target audience´ of their actions) seems to be conclusive in the case of Chechnya as well. The descriptions of the Chechen economy mentioned in the last section should provide enough evidence to illustrate how options within the normal market were not available to meet the needs of the entire population. The society¶s organizational structure into teips mentioned in the cultural section of the paper should also give evidence to support how individuals in Chechnya use violence to gain supporters and coerce opponents. Further, group-think and the hope of retaliation were and continue to be prominent in the Chechen society. All of the suicide terrorists in the sample of the study mentioned above had family members who either disappeared, were killed or tortured. Forty-seven percent of the sample experienced the death of more than one family member, indicating that attacks can come as a result of the hope for retribution, following traumatic events.296 As violence persisted throughout the 1990s (and continues today) it is not difficult to extrapolate these influences to create a scenario in which the larger terrorist community within Chechnya suffers from similar influences and thus responds similarly. 296 Ibid, 339. 101 Conclusions of the Chechen Case: This chapter examined the underlying conditions which predisposed the region to the initiation of terrorist movements within the area of the North Caucus designated as Chechnya. The first two chapters of this thesis have also analyzed the underlying conditions within Algeria and Northern Ireland which predisposed these regions to the use of terrorism. This chapter tested and confirmed the theories based on arguments derived from the five working groups devoted to understanding the underlying conditions of terrorism at the March 2005, Madrid Summit. It was apparent from the historical account provided that the deportations of the 1940s under Stalin contributed to initial feelings of oppression. This was later combined with other negative influences, such as a coup attempt, the destruction of cities and heavy civilian casualties from the Russian army (in addition to economic and political circumstances) to predispose the society to terrorism. These substandard economic conditions fueled further grievances and pushed some toward the black market and terrorist activity (as an alternative form of income.) The Chechen degree of tolerance for Russians in their own communities and for Russians across the country was relatively low. The relative deprivation of this group seems to have been influential in predisposing the region to terrorism. Psychologically, rational choice theory was confirmed as the use of violence (given the circumstances provided) appeared to be a logically made decision. Further evidence of group-think and attempts to use violence in response to traumatic events experienced by the militant or a family member were conclusive as well. 102 Thesis Conclusions: Based on these three cases it is evident that no single definitive explanation can identify why some turn to terrorism and some do not. Even though this is the case, it is necessary to conduct research in the hope of contributing to a framework that can outline the underlying conditions which contribute to terrorism, so that policy makers will be able to make the most informed future decisions possible. This thesis attempted to lay a foundation to test the applicability of the categories of theories currently thought to be factors in contributing to the predisposition of some societies to terrorism. In this thesis the combination of economic and political factors which can produce relative deprivation and socioeconomic marginalization of an ethnic or religious group is emphasized. Economic and political factors are separated in much of the literature; however the cases studied show links between the two categories. For instance in both the Algerian and Northern Irish cases, discrimination and a lack of political representation of the Muslim majority and Catholic minority limited the ability for the groups¶ members to gain access to housing, jobs and affect how government resources were distributed within the country. The structural discriminatory practices displayed within these closed political systems can help to partially explain how well-educated individuals could be restrained from obtaining economic success within their country. In spite of poor socioeconomic and political conditions, terrorism did not begin in these two countries until peaceful attempts to change the status quo were repressed by the ruling regime. The relationship exhibited encapsulates an environment that pits those who have little against those who have the most within their society. In other words, the 103 comparatively poor relative economic and political status of those within the negatively affected group was a motivator for terrorism. For example, Northern Ireland (and Ireland as a whole) has a less vibrant overall economy relative to Great Britain at the international level and Catholics had less economically relative to Protestant peers within Northern Ireland until the end of the 20th century. The same relationship is demonstrated between Algeria and France and Chechnya and Russia at the international level and between Muslims and Europeans domestically during the same time period. These situations exemplified how people respond when their identities and human dignity are threatened and are forced to submit to an unequal or unjust system by an oppressive foreign power. It is not difficult to understand why some would rebel against authority when faced with these circumstances. The original organizations which led the initial rebellions against state authority held both economic and political goals, which reflected the negative social conditions within these areas of society. However, it is important to note that in spite of the nature of their goals, these groups eventually strayed from attacking military or political figures and instead targeted civilians. Many revolutionary groups throughout history have justifiably rebelled against oppressive regimes and negative circumstances to find independence and freedom. These case studies have identified three scenarios in which the violence of a repressive regime and a system of inequality which alienates the majority from the elites can lead to understandable rebellions. However, many groups have rebelled but did not choose to target civilians in other countries or outside of the actual conflict itself. This provides an example of how psychological factors may be present in the situations previously mentioned and could have an additive 104 effect when combined with the other underlying factors that contribute to terrorism to push modern groups toward these types of violence. In the main, this thesis confirms the validity of each of the theories presented through their application to the three case studies (though the degree of applicability varies from case to case.) However, the strength of the theories individually is limited and can only provide a certain degree of insight into the predisposition of these societies to terrorism. Taken together however, they provide a more representative construct, capable of conveying a broader perspective and greater depth of understanding. This demonstrates how theorists attempting to approach the topic with one broad overarching theory neglect important aspects of the complexities within each given circumstance of different countries and terrorist groups. 105 Appendix Map-1: Religious Distribution in Belfast (1991) Map-2 Algerian Population Distribution (1971) 106 Appendix Table-1 Table-2 107 Bibliography (Ch.1) Abadie, Alberto. ³Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,´ The American Economic Review, Vol.96, No. 2 (May, 2006): 50-56. 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(New York: New York University Press), 2007. 115 Curriculum Vita Patrick A. Little DOB: November 25, 1987 Johns Hopkins University, Advanced Academic Program, Washington, DC Masters of Arts in Global Security Studies, 2011 Coursework in economics, environmental and energy security, counterterrorism, Islam, military strategy and terrorism Thesis topic: The underlying conditions which predispose societies to the use of terrorism University of Rochester, Rochester, NY B.A. 2006 Majors: International Relations and Political Science; Minor: French Coursework in international relations, international negotiations, peace and conflict negotiations, Middle Eastern studies, Islam, French language, terrorism and domestic politics International Education of Students (IES), Dublin, Ireland Peace and Conflict Studies, 2009 Coursework in economics and politics of the European Union, Irish history, studies of the Northern Irish conflict and peace and conflict resolution 116